The Memory Box

URLs & Links :: BBcode

Author: aristana
Subject: BBcode
Posted: Feb 06, 2010 00:30 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

Image with a link in BBcode? i wanna put an immage with a link in a furom i dont know if you put html or BBcode..
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URLs & Links :: RE: HTML to BBCode Converter & offline BBCode writer

Author: aristana
Posted: Oct 29, 2009 05:21 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 2

How to replace bbcode in phpbb3 to any text editors? I am using phpbb3 in my websites in that for text editors bbcode is there. How can i change to WYSIWYG editor? It is very much difficult to work with that..
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Eurabia :: Help, question about activation

Author: Valentine_Trollopee82
Subject: Help, question about activation
Posted: Oct 16, 2009 05:59 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

Hi Guys, I am newbie in the internet stuff and I dont know if I am writing on correct board on this website. I
have got problem with activating my account. I received email but when I click on the link it was not working, is this link is correct? http://forumactivationlink.com,

Zionism :: The Transfer Agreem When Zionists made deal with the Nazis

Author: nobody
Subject: The Transfer Agreem When Zionists made deal with the Nazis
Posted: Sep 24, 2009 09:15 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

When Zionists made deal with the Nazis
Sep. 23, 2009
EDWIN BLACK, Special to JPost , THE JERUSALEM POST

On the afternoon of August 7, 1933, at 76 Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, on a day when well-dressed Jews in Germany could not step into the street without fear, when laboring kibbutzniks in Palestine proudly swept the midday perspiration from their foreheads, when anxious German businessmen worried the next telegram would cancel yet another order for increasingly unsellable Reich goods, when Nazi organizers throughout Europe gleefully reviewed statistics on Jewish populations and Jewish assets within their midst, when Polish blackshirts viciously beat Jews in town squares, when ordinary jobless Germans wondered where they could find enough money for the next meal, when young Jewish boys in German schools were forced to stand painfully before their classmates as examples of detestable vermin, when defiant Jews across America and England raised their fists in anger proliferating their punishing anti-German boycott, when Jewish Palestinian exporters wondered nervously whether their biggest customer, Germany, would retaliate, when thousands of homeless German Jews existed as refugees and some in concentration camps, when the prospects for Jewry in Europe seemed over, on this fateful day in the first summer of the Hitler regime, an official delegation of four German and Palestinian Zionists and one independent Palestinian businessman were ushered into an Economics Ministry conference room. The Jews had been authorized by a combine of Jewish and Zionist bodies to negotiate with the Third Reich.

After hours of wrangled debate, Hans Hartenstein, director of the Reich Office of Currency Control, was about to call the meeting to an inconclusive close when a messenger from Deutsche Reichpost delivered a telegram from the German consul in Tel Aviv. The telegram advised Hartenstein that a coalition of official and commercial Zionist interests in Palestine was the best way to break the growing Jewish-led worldwide anti-Nazi boycott that was crippling the Hitler regime in its first months. A deal with the Zionists would be necessary.

And so it was done. The Transfer Agreement was created. There was no hard-copy contract with names penned at the bottom. The agreement was actually an official Reich decree, 54/33, issued three days later, on August 10, by the Reich Economics Ministry. The decree authorized the Zionists to create two transfer clearinghouses, one under the supervision of the German Zionist Federation in Berlin, one under the supervision of Anglo-Palestine's trust company in Palestine. The office in Tel Aviv was called Haavara Trust and Transfer Office Ltd. Often called Haavara Ltd. for short, this corporation was organized under the Palestinian commercial code and operated by business managers. Its stock was wholly owned by the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which was later renamed Bank Leumi.

Haavara, the Hebrew word for transfer, quickly became a synonym for transfer.

The bargain was this: Jews could leave Germany before being pauperized, and take some of their assets with them in the form of new German goods which the Zionist movement would then sell in Palestine and eventually throughout much of the world market. The proceeds would be given to the emigrants, with a portion reserved for state-building projects such as industrial infrastructure and land purchase.

Jews could not enter Palestine without a so-called "Capitalist Certificate" issued by the British proving they possessed the equivalent of $5,000. Transfer made this possible. Addressing more than just active emigrants, the Transfer Agreement allowed "potential emigrants" to protect their assets in these special bank accounts which again could not be accessed without purchasing and reselling German goods. Between the active and potential emigration accounts, the Transfer apparatus meant millions of reichsmarks - to both the Germans and Zionists.

The more goods the Germans sold, the more Jews would be permitted out of Germany and into Palestine, and the more money would be available to build the Jewish state. The price of this commerce-linked exodus would be the abandonment of the commercial war against Nazi Germany. The punishing, global anti-Nazi boycott that organizers loudly promised would topple the Hitler regime in its first year, this growing nonsectarian and interfaith coalition that every day was vituperatively breaking German contracts, canceling German orders and diverting German business to any Depression-era competitor who would step forward. Jews were fighting back. The Nazis had decided that this moral counterattack - one which Germany feared more than any other Jewish response - had to be stopped.

It did not matter whether the anti-Nazi boycott could have succeeded in real terms. Boycott effectiveness is not measured in dollars and pfennigs but in ergs of fear. The Germans feared the mythical international Jewish conspiracy of global economic manipulation more than any other.

The Zionists understood it. And soon the Jewish and nonsectarian boycott organizations came to grips with it. One could not save a Jew from the Nazis without selling German goods. That killed the boycott before the boycott could even begin to kill the Third Reich.

Whole branches of Jewry would wither, but the trunk would survive - Herzl's words. This one time, this crucial and unparalleled time, the Jewish emergency would be used to secure a future, not ransom a past. From this crisis of humiliation, agony and expulsion would come sanctuary, nationhood and a new Jew, with a new home to call his own. In its various public and private forms, the Transfer Agreement shifted some 60,000 Jews and $100 million - almost $1.7 billion in 2009 dollars - to Jewish Palestine. Ultimately, the Transfer Agreement saved lives, rescued assets and seeded the infrastructure of the Jewish state to be.

DURING THE prewar years, the Transfer Agreement tore the Jewish world apart, turning leader against leader, prompting rebellion and even assassination within the Yishuv and Diaspora alike. Jewish Agency de-facto foreign minister Haim Arlosoroff, who had negotiated the deal on behalf of the Zionist Mapai Party, was assassinated on an empty stretch of the Tel Aviv beach (near where the Tel Aviv Hilton now stands), presumably by Revisionist Zionists of the Ze'ev Jabotinsky camp. The Revisionist Zionists, a minority at the time, violently opposed the deal with the Nazis. Today streets everywhere in Israel are named for Arlosoroff.

American Jewish leaders and organizations such as the American Jewish Congress and Stephen Wise - choosing the Zionist solution - were forever soul-torn by the decision to abandon the organized and cohesive boycott against the Nazis. Official Jewry left the protest war to a ragtag, disorganized but ardent movement devoid of support where it counted. However, without the boycott, there would have never been a Transfer Agreement.

Despite the searing communal outrage, as the situation for Jews in Europe worsened, variations on the same German transfer arrangement were readied by Zionists for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other Nazi-occupied or dominated countries. Then, when war erupted, when dispossession turned to annihilation, the Transfer was used to rescue whatever and whoever could be rescued. The debate disappeared. However, by that time, the Transfer Agreement had been curtailed or terminated in most respects.

For almost three decades, the Transfer Agreement and the anguished details surrounding it were forgotten. Finally, in 1984, when the full story became known with the original publication of The Transfer Agreement, the book launched a fiery debate, a debate few were prepared to comprehend. Back then, the world and the Jewish community were still confronting the genocide, the survivors and the guilty.

The world's emphasis was on the murderous events of the war years. Organized remembrance was collectively fighting an anti-Semitic revisionist movement that was trying to deny or minimize the Holocaust with rabid pseudo-history. Few, especially in the English-speaking world, had publicly spoken in detail about the financial aspects of the Holocaust until the book's publication. Few had used the words "Zionist" and "Nazi" in the same sentence until this book did.

For perspective, consider that the very first television attempt to treat the Holocaust was a TV series called The Holocaust, which aired in 1978 - the same year neo-Nazis marched through Skokie, Illinois, a Chicago suburb. That was the year, 1978, research began on The Transfer Agreement. At the time, the Second Generation movement of children of Holocaust survivors was just forming. The First World Gathering of Holocaust Survivors was only in the planning stage. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum, which received its charter in 1980, was several years and many controversies away from opening. Organized Holocaust education was essentially nonexistent. For society and for survivors, the dominant priority was coming to grips with the genocide - not the assets.

Today, society understands most of the outward manifestations of what happened. Now the world has turned almost entirely to other more worldly questions: assets.

Pilfered Swiss bank accounts, stolen art, blood gold, expropriated property, slave wages, unpaid insurance policies and financial collusion. Everywhere the accusations and the defenses swirl not about the issue of murder but around the issue of money. First the world struggled with the death toll. Now the world struggles with the dollar toll.

As such, it places the Transfer Agreement at the forefront. While international efforts continue to recover lost Jewish assets, the Transfer Agreement stands alone as the sole asset rescue that actually worked. And it worked contemporaneously, not with the benefit of hindsight, not lubricated by the after-tears of devastation but in the hellish frenzy of the Nazified day as Zionist leaders looked over their shoulder to remember the past and up to the heavens to envision the future. They remembered and reminded their contemporaries that even Moses was commanded by God to take the sheep and goats. In that context, the world can examine the enormous task facing the Zionist negotiators of 1933 and the monumental arrangements they sealed.

A few coldly realistic Zionist leaders in an office on Wilhelmstrasse were willing to make those decisions. It helped save a people. It helped create a state. Nonetheless, 25 years after the book was published and more than 75 years after the deal was negotiated, the nagging questions still haunts all those who confront the Transfer Agreement. Was it madness? Or was it genius?

The writer is the award-winning best-selling author of IBM and the Holocaust, and his first book, The Transfer Agreement, has now been rereleased in a 25th anniversary edition (Dialog Press), with an afterword by Abraham Foxman. www.edwinblack.com
This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?cid=1253627550497&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull

URLs & Links :: RE: HTML to BBCode Converter & offline BBCode writer

Author: braddmark
Posted: Sep 13, 2009 01:00 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 2

That seems like a great guide on converting html into bbc but their is still an exception, and that is on tables.

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Documents :: The Operation in Gaza - Factual & Legal Aspects29 Jul 20

Author: nobody
Subject: The Operation in Gaza - Factual & Legal Aspects29 Jul 20
Posted: Aug 12, 2009 12:40 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

The Operation in Gaza - Factual and Legal Aspects
29 Jul 2009

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Operation_in_Gaza-Factual_and_Legal_Aspects.htm

UNWRA :: RE: Definition of refugee under UNWRA

Author: dajudem
Posted: Aug 10, 2009 07:33 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 2

above unispal link is broken

See: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/68c845adcff3671a85256c85005a4592?OpenDocument

UNWRA :: UNWRA Unispal 54

Author: dajudem
Subject: UNWRA Unispal 54
Posted: Feb 20, 2009 11:52 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

A/2717 of 30 June 1954|| UNISPAL Home ||
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/1ce874ab1832a53e852570bb006dfaf6/29b65fb0fee24daa052565a10059d678!OpenDocument
UNITED NATIONSA

General Assembly A/2717 30 June 1954

UNITED NATIONS

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND
WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES
IN THE NEAR EAST

Covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: NINTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 17 (A/2717)

New York, 1954

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION.................................... 1

I. THE AGENCY'S MISSION....................... 1

II. THE PROVISION OF RELIEF..................... 2

(a) Registration and numbers ................ 2
(b) Rations............................ 2
(c) Shelter .................. ........ 2
(d) Health ...................... ..... 2
(e) Welfare ........................... 3
(f) Clothing ......................... 3
(g) Cost of relief ....................... 3

III. THE REHABILITATION PROGRAMME.................... 3

IV. EDUCATION AND TRAINING POLICY................ 4

V. THE POSITION OF THE AGENCY ................. 5

(a) Finances.......................... 5
(b) Organization ..................... 5
(c) The future........................ 5

ANNEXES

A. Statistics:
Table 1. Number of refugees and rations distributed............... 7
Table 2. Distribution of refugees according to age,
sex and country of residence as at 30 June 1954.................... 7
B. Financial operations............................................ 7
C. Rehabilitation.................................................. 9
D. Education and training.......................................... 18
E. Health......................................................... 23
F. Welfare........................................................ 27
G. Legal aspects of the work of the Agency........................ 30
H. Co-operation with other United Nations organizations .......... 33

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, the following report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is submitted to the General Assembly. This report, the fourth of the series, covers the period from 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954.

2. As of 15 June 1954, Mr. Henry R. Labouisse was appointed Director of the Agency, in succession to Mr. John B. Blandford, Jr., who resigned on 7 March 1953. During the intervening period, the work was directed by Mr. Leslie J. Carver, the Deputy Director of the Agency.

3. For details of the origin of the Agency and of the measures taken from time to time by the United Nations to deal with the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine, the reader is referred to the annual reports of the Director of the Agency, to the special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly and to other United Nations documents.1

4. The present report consists of a general section and a series of annexes dealing in more detail with the different functional activities.

I. THE AGENCY'S MISSION

5. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency was established by resolution 302 (IV) adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 1949. Its stated functions were, first, to carry out, in collaboration with local Governments, a programme of relief and works for the benefit of Palestine refugees in the Near East; and, secondly, to consult with those Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects would no longer be available.

6. The relief programme involved in the main the free provision of food for about 950,000 persons and of shelter, at first mostly in tents, for about a third of them. The works projects were based on those recommended by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East in the autumn of 1949 and consisted mainly of road-building, afforestation and miscellaneous small constructional works.

7. For a variety of reasons, the works projects were not successful.
Furthermore, they did not permanently remove refugees from cependence on relief any more than did the small trading that had sprung up in camps or the seasonal and casual employment that many refugees had found. In resolution 393 (V), adopted on 2 December 1950, the General Assembly therefore considered that, without prejudice to the provisions of previous resolutions concerning repatriation or compensation, "the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and
for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area . . .". The emphasis thus placed on works leading to rehabilitation rather than to the provision of temporary employment was further ndorsed when, on 26 January 1952, the General Assembly in resolution 513 (VI) approved a new programme to guide the work of the Agency over a period of approximately three years ending 30 June 1954 (this period was extended for one more year by action of the General Assembly at its eighth session).

8. The general objective of that programme was to move refugees from ration lines to self-supporting employment, and to make them economic assets of the Near Eastern countries. As it was formulated, refugees were to be helped to find employment; they were to receive loans and training; houses were to be built; and agricultural lands developed. The programme was intended to set a target for the termination of relief operations and was not to intrude into political issues between the Arab States and Israel or between the refugees and Israel; in particular, it was to be without prejudice to repatriation or compensation referred to in previous resolutions. It was assumed that Governments would co-operate with the programme, which would become an integral part of the economic development of the host countries. To support the programme, a rehabilitation fund of $200 million was established (though it was
recognized that considerable additional expenditures from other sources would be necessary to support the general economic development), and budgetary provision was made for a continuation of relief. Efforts were to be made to arrange for the transfer of the administration both of relief and of rehabilitation to the host Governments at the earliest possible date.

II. THE PROVISION OF RELIEF

9. For the various reasons touched upon in the present report, it has not proved possible to eliminate, or in fact to effect any significant reduction in, the relief operations and budget of the Agency. The care and maintenance of refugees has remained a basic and vitally important function. Moreover, as the longer-term requirement for relief became more and more apparent, it proved necessary and desirable for the Agency to make gradual improvements in the type and standards of the services it provided.

(a) REGISTRATION AND NUMBERS

10. The criteria for accepting refugees on the relief rolls were that they
should be genuine refugees who had lived in Palestine for two years or more prior to the beginning of the conflict in 1948 and had lost their homes and livelihood as a result of that conflict. Additions to the rolls have been and are made to include new births and, under certain conditions, those persons who have suffered loss of income. The most important reasons for deletions of names from the rolls are death, emigration and the earning of income sufficient for self-support.

11. There are undoubtedly numerous improper registrations. It has proved difficult and in some cases impossible for the Agency to develop a satisfactory system for assuring deletions from the rolls of all persons not entitled to rations or other assistance from the Agency. The Agency is continuing its efforts, both with the host Governments and with the refugees, to develop a workable and adequate system which will protect the legitimate interests of all concerned. It has not yet been possible to make it clear to the refugees who are entitled to assistance, and to those Governments where doubt remains, that the purpose in mind is to ensure the best use of the available funds and that it is the refugees only who suffer from improper or false registrations.

12. Table 1 of annex A to the present report shows the number of refugees registered with the Agency. Of the total, more than a half (that is, 487,000) live in Jordan; of those, 271,000 live in West Jordan, an area of the former mandated territory of Palestine incorporated into Jordan in 1949, and nearly a quarter live in the Gaza strip, the area formerly mandated that is under Egyptian military government. Table 2 of annex A shows the ages of the refugees; approximately half those registered with the Agency are less than 15 years of age. It should here be emphasized that the considerable rate of natural increase is an important reason for the intractable nature of the problem facing the Agency. It should be noted that the local populations, not counting the refugees
registered with the Agency, number in Lebanon about 1,346,000, in Syria about 3,795,000, in Jordan about 880,000 (of which more than half live in West Jordan) and in Gaza about 100,000.

(b) RATIONS

13. With the exception noted in the following paragraph, there has been no change in the basic food ration, which provides about 1,600 calories in winter and 1,500 in summer.

14. The relief budget for the year under review, approved by the General
Assembly at its eighth session, made possible the provision of full rations to certain groups (including children from one to seven years old) which had previously received only half rations.

15. In addition to providing the basic dry ration to refugees in general and to providing supplementary meals whose distribution had been increased and composition improved during the previous fiscal period, the Agency gives to children under one year old (who do not receive the basic ration) 1,200 grammes of whole milk, and to children from one to fifteen years and to pregnant and nursing women, 1,040 grammes of skim milk daily. The great majority of refugees supplement their dry ration with meat, fruit, vegetables, eggs, etc., either grown by themselves or exchanged for part of their rations or bought with their
small and irregular earnings. Nevertheless, nutrition experts from the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization have drawn attention to increasing signs of under-nourishment among certain groups of children.

(c) SHELTER

16. Approximately the same proportion of refugees (about one-third) lived in camps during the period under review as previously. The budget approved by the General Assembly at its eighth session made it possible, however, to provide for an increase and improvement in camp accommodation in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Since the Assembly meets during the latter part of the calendar year (towards the middle of the Agency's fiscal year), action could only be taken during 1954. The construction of new camp accommodation is now under way. It
should be completed in Gaza by the autumn of the present year; but the extension planned in the other countries will not have been achieved until the spring of 1955 at the earliest. The cost in all countries is being carried forward into the Agency's budget for 1954-1955.

17. In spite of this delay, by March 1954 only 32 per cent of the camp
population was housed in tents, whereas the proportion had been 39 per cent in February 1953 and 87 per cent in March 1951. Many refugee camps are thus increasingly taking on the appearance of villages and towns, with school buildings, small workshops and communal facilities such as bath houses and recreational centres, as well as small shops opened by enterprising refugees.18. Even though living conditions have thus been improved for a large number of refugees, there is still a very substantial proportion whose living conditions are far from adequate. This is in part due to the unwillingness of some of the refugees to accept anything but the most temporary and transient type of accommodation, presumably because they have been led to believe that an improvement in their living conditions would somehow prejudice their chances of
eventual repatriation. It is in part due also to the fact that the Agency has
been unable, both because of shortage of funds and because of the unavailability of suitable sites, to provide accommodations in camps for many refugees who need them.

(d) HEALTH

19. The Agency's health services, of which a full account will be found in annex E to the present report, have continued fundamentally unchanged save for improvements dictated by experience or brought about by improved training.

20. During the period under review, the health education of the refugee public and the control of insects have been given special attention. Special training has been started for health educators, who will work as members of health teams comprising representatives of the other social services. The insect control programme also acts as one method of health education, as well as fulfilling its major purpose -- to prevent insect-borne diseases. An important anti-malaria campaign has been initiated in the Jordan Valley as a measure preparatory to the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley development project.

21. Although the Agency's health programme in the circumstances has been remarkable, there are certain important needs still to be met. For example, there is a shortage of trained medical and health staff of all sorts; pit latrines in the camps must be replaced by septic latrines; the almost complete lack of tuberculosis hospital beds for refugees in Jordan must be overcome, and adequate buildings erected for the existing tented tuberculosis hospital in Lebanon.

(e) WELFARE

22. A description of the Agency's welfare services is contained in annex F
below. These services fill needs that are not met by the normal routine
programmes.
23. The Agency's Welfare Division is the point of contact with the very
important group of voluntary agencies whose activities, supplementing those of the Agency as a whole, mean so much in the life of the refugees. A summary of the supplies and services provided will also be found in annex F, and this opportunity is taken of acknowledging the great help given by the voluntary agencies.

(f) CLOTHING

24. The Agency's resources have never been adequate to enable it to provide clothing for the refugees in its care. Clothing needs have had to be provided by the refugees themselves or through donations from outside sources. As the years have gone by, the refugees have largely used up what clothing they had been able to bring with them from their homes. The need for outside help has, therefore, been steadily and urgently increasing. Had it not been for the generous and
determined efforts of various voluntary agencies, the plight of the refugees would have been even more serious. Even though donations of clothing from voluntary agencies have increased substantially over the years, this increase has not been sufficient to meet all the minimum needs of the refugees. The ill-clad condition of the children is particularly noticeable. It is hoped that increased supplies of clothing can be provided by the voluntary agencies. In addition, consideration is being given to the feasibility of a distribution of cotton cloth, which would be of importance both to the physical well-being of the refugees and from the psychological point of view.

(g) COST OF RELIEF

25. In summary, the Agency has during the past year managed, at a cost of $23,900,000, to provide rations, health care and certain welfare and
supplementary services for a number of refugees amounting, at the end of the year, to about 887,000 persons, and shelter for some 320,000. This cost works out at the low average figure of approximately $27 per head per year.

26. The cost of relief at the current level will, it is estimated, amount to $26 million in 1954-1955. This is $8 million more than the $18 million provisionally authorized by the General Assembly at its eighth session. It should, however, be recalled that the figure of $18 million was based on the assumption that 65,000 refugees would be employed in projects, and that the relief budget would be relieved of the cost of maintaining them and their families (a total of, say, 325,000 persons). In fact, as is seen in annex C to the present report, some 8,000 refugees only have been permanently removed from the ration lists resulting in temporary reductions amounting to about 25,000 ration months. The following section shows that a very substantial additional employment of refugees is not to be expected in the near future. This fact, plus the fact that
there will be a very substantial natural increase in the population, means that there can be no reduction in relief costs in 1954-1955 -- assuming that current standards are continued. If improvements are to be made in those standards, the cost will of course rise.

III. THE REHABILITATION PROGRAMME

27. The programme endorsed by the General Assembly at its sixth session and referred to under section I above had, as its goal, the gradual reduction of the cost of relief and the eventual elimination of relief through rehabilitation measures. The original date set for the attainment of that goal was about 30 June 1954.

28. Although, as it appears in retrospect, the achievement of such a result in so short a period of time was a practical impossibility, there can be no doubt but that the General Assembly hoped and expected that substantial progress would be made towards the desired end. Since the progress appears on the surface to have been negligible, it is important for the Assembly to review and evaluate what has been done, to take note of the obstacles faced and to consider the possibilities for the future.

29. The rehabilitation annex to the present report (annex C) contains summary data and information on the principal projects undertaken or supported by the Agency. It discloses real progress on a number of relatively small projects and encouraging beginnings on two major ones.

30. The latter relate to the work done to date on the project for irrigation in north-west Sinai and in connexion with the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley development. Essential but time-consuming survey work, as well as agricultural and economic studies, have been carried out on each of these projects, and it is expected that the Agency will be in a position within the next few months to determine the extent to which the projects are physically feasible and to make arrangements preliminary to the start of actual construction. Assuming their physical feasibility, the final determination as to whether or not the projects will be undertaken will depend on the conclusion of satisfactory agreements with the Governments concerned.

31. It is important to recognize, however, that when these two projects are completed they will provide, as presently contemplated, a living for an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons only, and it will be some years before that number can be considered fully self-supporting. The most recent estimate of the progress of the Sinai project is that engineering works will take two years to complete, and that it will take a number of years longer to install 10,000 families and make them fully elf-supporting by agriculture. The Jordan Valley project is not likely to take less time.

32. As regards the obstacles to the attainment of the goal envisaged by the General Assembly, a very important one is the absence of a solution along the lines of the Assembly's resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation. Apart from that, the slow progress can be attributed in large part to the meagreness of the physical resources made available for development. In part, also, the attitude of the refugees and, in some cases, that of the Governments have served to make progress difficult.

33. As regards the refugees, the majority of them have been exiles for six years, but time has not softened the bitterness of separation. The prevailing sentiment of at least the older refugees is the longing to return to their homes. In the absence of some other acceptable solution, that sentiment will continue to dominate the attitude of the refugees as a group, and it would be a serious mistake to under-estimate its strength.

34. Unfortunately, the refugees as a group have not as yet come to realize that, even if there could be a prompt and acceptable political settlement, it would in all probability require several years of readjustment before they could re-achieve a satisfactory manner of life. Instead of recognizing that rehabilitation projects will greatly ease this readjustment and help to prepare them for re-entry into normal life, many of the refugees consider that the concept of "rehabilitation" means depriving them of something. Consequently, they do not yet fully accept the fact that it is in their interests, and particularly those of their children, to participate in and to welcome projects for rehabilitation -- despite the fact that it is made clear to them that such participation would not prejudice their rights to repatriation or compensation.
35. Moreover no settlement, however temporary, of refugees can take place without the consent of the host Government concerned. The host Governments naturally have had to bear in mind the interests of their own indigenous populations. They have also been aware of the feeling of the refugees, and apparently have not wanted to take or approve actions which the refugees might consider prejudicial to their rights -- particularly those rights relating to repatriation and compensation. Even though no project which the Agency has proposed would prejudice these rights, certain of the Governments concerned have not been prepared to undertake with the Agency the development of some promising
rehabilitation projects. In other cases, however, it has been recognized by the Governments concerned that such projects are in the best interests of their eople, including the refugees; as shown in annex C, progress is being made.

36. As indicated above, one of the most serious obstacles to the attainment of
the goal set by the General Assembly concerning rehabilitation stems from the
inadequacies of physical resources. Much of the land thus far made available for
agricultural development in the areas presently within reach of the refugees is marginal at best -- and, in some cases, unusable. Aside from the Yarmuk-Jordan
Valley and Sinai projects, there appear to be no practicable possibilities for
major rehabilitation projects in the areas in which the largest numbers of the
refugees are now living.

37. In spite of the obstacles and difficulties confronting the rehabilitation
programme, it is most important that every effort should be continued to further
it. In this connexion, there is a real need for additional major projects to be
made available and developed in the Near and Middle East if the population
problem, including the refugee problem, is to be handled in the best interests
of the people. And, taking into account purely economic considerations, it must
be recognized that the problem is a long-term one which will require many years
of developmental and engineering work.

38. A study which the Agency has recently completed of the planned economic
development of the region discloses that this development will be mainly by way
of increases in the area of cultivated land, since the expansion of local
industry will not alone greatly relieve the pressure of growing numbers upon
production. The study further reveals that, on the basis of planning already in
process, only Iraq will have succeeded by 1975 in bringing under cultivation
more land than is required to maintain its population (including
the natural increase) at the present standard of living. Unless new projects
additional to those under consideration in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are
undertaken, those countries would all have in 1975 larger numbers of people to
support per unit of irrigated land than at present. All four must face the
urgent problem of accelerating the time schedule of development projects now
under way or planned.

39. The rate of acceleration and the ability to develop new projects will depend
upon the availability of finance and of trained personnel. To keep pace with the
population increase, and to enable the refugees to become self-supporting, the
countries of the area must secure additional funds from internal or external
sources to step up the present rate of expenditure for development. One source
of external funds which is immediately available is the balance of the Agency's
rehabilitation fund. The question that remains is: can that balance be committed
for projects that show a promise of success?

IV. EDUCATION AND TRAINING POLICY

40. In the light of the factors discussed above, and particularly of the growing
awareness of the longer-term character of the refugee problem, the Agency has
considered it necessary and desirable to introduce certain changes in its
education and training policy. The nature of these changes, as well as the
extent to which all phases of education have expanded during 1953-1954, are set
forth in more detail in annex D to the present report. It will be noted that
registration in UNRWA primary and secondary schools has increased and that, by
these means and with the aid of grants paid to Governments and private schools,
the total number of children receiving academic education is approximately
155,000. A further increase in numbers is to be expected for the next school
year.

41. The increase in the numbers of children -- both boys and girls -- seeking
education in schools organized or aided by UNRWA has placed a greater financial
burden on the Agency and has enlarged its responsibilities. But, by the same
token, the Agency has been granted a greater opportunity, working in
collaboration with the host Governments, to prepare the children for a useful
life.

42. Unfortunately, in spite of good will on the part of certain of the host
countries, their economies cannot at present absorb any significant number of
people unexpectedly entering the labour market. It is anticipated, however, that
the development of Near Eastern economies over the next ten to twenty years will
call for a supply of labour of all types, including skilled agriculturists,
workmen and artisans. It must also be recognized that the quality of
craftsmanship in the Near East is not as high as it could be, and that a
constant supply of skilled workmen and artisans trained to a higher level than
the existing average is required in order to raise the general standard.

43. The potential economic expansion that could and, it is hoped, will take
place in this region over the next twenty years is a challenge to the
educational systems of all States in the area. The Agency is in a good position
to set in motion measures which can help to meet that challenge, for its
educational system is still comparatively new and flexible. It proposes to do so
by expanding, as rapidly as possible, a system of vocational training centres
similar to the two already operating near Jerusalem and in the Gaza strip. These
centres, of which it is at present planned to build eight more (five of them
specializing in agriculture) will provide artisans and agricultural experts and
leaders trained to higher standards. In addition, they will achieve three other
objectives. The first is to train instructors who can be used whenever a rapid
expansion in training facilities becomes necessary. The second is to provide
facilities for re-training artisans whose skills have deteriorated as a result
of long periods of unemployment. The third is to provide facilities for
trade-testing, so that employers seeking skilled work-men can determine whether
recruits are suitable for the jobs for which they have applied.

44. In order to ensure that the pupils at the vocational training centres are
possessed of the necessary aptitudes, the Agency proposes to introduce a
handicraft programme. This will be confined during 1954-1955 to the Gaza strip,
where special classrooms are being built and Palestinian instructors trained.

V. THE POSITION OF THE AGENCY
(a) FINANCES

45. Financial statements for the fiscal year ended 30 June 1954 will be
presented to the General Assembly separately, together with the report of the
Board of Auditors. Summary comments on the statements are set forth in annex B
below.

46. Similarly, the Agency's detailed plan of expenditure for 1954-1955 and its
request for cash contributions will be submitted in a separate report. A summary
is also contained in annex B.

47. In that annex, attention is also drawn to the difficulties arising from the
fact that the General Assembly's approval of the Agency's budget can only
(because of the normal date of the Assembly's sessions) be given several months
after the beginning of the financial year to which the budget relates. Certain
suggestions are made in the annex with a view to overcoming this difficulty.

(b) ORGANIZATION

48. A number of important changes in the organization of the Agency were
introduced during the past twelve months; in particular the different functions
have been grouped into three departments, each under the control of an assistant
director. One administrative measure of some importance was the conclusion of
arrangements with the United Nations Children's Fund whereby the latter
undertook to act as UNRWA's agent in the procurement of goods and supplies which
have to be imported from overseas. The experiment is still in the early stages,
and a review of the results so far achieved is in hand. A substantial part of
the Agency's requirements by quantity will continue to be purchased locally.

49. During the year under review, the Agency has made or planned a number of
changes in matters of employer-employee relationships designed to bring its
practices more into conformity with those of the United Nations Secretariat
proper. It has been arranged that an indemnity on termination will be paid,
amounting to one month's salary for each completed year of service. The
establishment of a provident fund is under discussion. Appeals boards, to advise
the Director on the application of certain regulations, have been put on a more
regular footing. A provisional staff committee has been set up.

(c) THE FUTURE

50. At its eighth session, the General Assembly decided to extend the Agency's
mandate until 30 June 1955, and to review the Agency's programme at the ninth
session.

51. As indicated in previous sections of the present report, even on the most
favourable assumptions it will take many years to bring about an improvement in
the economic circumstances of the Near East to the point where the refugees will
be capable of doing without assistance -- years during which some of them at
least must depend upon others for food and shelter and other basic needs.

52. Inquiries have been made of the host Governments to determine whether or not
they are prepared to accept administrative responsibility for the relief
programme. Formal replies in the negative have been received from two
Governments. There is every reason to believe that neither of the other two
Governments is prepared to accept this responsibility at the present time.
Although the reasons are not expressly stated, and may differ from country to
country, it is assumed that this reluctance or inability to accept
responsibility for the care and maintenance of the refugees derives largely from
political and financial causes.

53. It may also be due in part to a belief that the assumption of responsibility
would require the taking of such measures to expand the administrative services
of the host Governments as to make it impracticable at the present time. It is
recognized that the many and diverse problems involved in meeting the basic
needs of the refugees would impose a serious and difficult burden on the
existing services of some, if not all, of the Governments.

54. To determine whether or not it would in fact be practicable for the host
Governments to assume the responsibility for relief depends upon considerations
not wholly within the competence of the Agency to evaluate. If the host
Governments could take over, such a step would eliminate some of the operational
difficulties which have confronted the Agency, the legal status of which as an
international organization and as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations has
not always in the past been fully recognized. Moreover, in the event of a
transfer of relief responsibility, the General Assembly could then concentrate
the remaining aspects of the Agency's work in the hands of a body with different
and more specialized responsibilities.

55. It is most important, however, from the point of view of the efficiency and
morale of the staff of the Agency that a decision should be taken promptly on
this matter. The uncertainty which has existed concerning the extent and
duration of the Agency's work, as well as concerning its legal status, has
seriously impaired the Agency's ability to perform as adequately and effectively
as it itself would deem necessary and desirable.

56. Consequently, if it is accepted that the United Nations will be prepared to
continue to furnish financial and administrative assistance to the Palestine
Arab refugees, and that UNRWA will remain the agent for carrying on this work,
it is believed that certain measures will have to be taken to enable the Agency
to function on a more efficient and effective basis. One of these relates to the
period and conditions of employment. Efficiency requires that the members of the
staff should not only be good, but that they should be prepared to stay in the
area long enough to acquire a mastery of their jobs and for the Agency to
benefit therefrom. Offers of employment limited in time to one year make it
difficult to attract recruits of the quality required. If, therefore, the
General Assembly should decide this year to extend UNRWA's mandate, it is
considered important that it should do so for a reasonable number of years
subject, of course, to the proviso that, to the extent that satisfactory
arrangements can be made with the host Governments for transferring
responsibility for all or part of the Agency's functions, such transfers should
be made.

57. Although these do not require specific General Assembly action, it should be
noted that there are some further difficulties which the Agency has encountered
during the past twelve months and which must be overcome if the Agency continues
in being and is to function efficiently and in the best interests of the
refugees. The following instances may be given: opposition to the development of
a satisfactory system for deleting from the rolls the names of persons not
entitled to rations or other assistance from the Agency; refusal to allow the
importation of goods purchased abroad; attempts to establish control over the
internal administration of the Agency; the attachment of certain bank accounts;
and continued attempts to levy taxes on materials and assets used by the Agency
in its operations or owned by it. It is to be hoped that satisfactory
arrangements could be made to overcome such difficulties where they continue to
exist.

58. In addition to the points mentioned in paragraphs 56 and 57 as important
requisites if the Agency's mandate is to be continued, there are a number of
other matters of importance upon which the Assembly's guidance or instructions
will also be required if the Agency is to carry on its work effectively. Among
these are: a clear statement as to the Agency's objectives and terms of
reference; the adoption of measures to enable longer term budgetary planning and
approval; an indication of the standards of relief to be made available; the
problem of the so-called "economic refugees"; and the question of the extent, if
any, to which rehabilitation funds can be employed on general economic and
agricultural improvements of indirect benefit to the refugees, as distinguished
from projects of direct benefit to ration recipients. The Director intends to
discuss all these matters with the Advisory Commission and will be prepared to
make recommendations to the Assembly should that body wish to consider an
extension of the Agency's mandate.

ANNEXES
ANNEX A
Table 1
NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND RATIONS DISTRIBUTEDED

June 1950June 1951June 1952June 1953June 1954
RefugeesRationsRefugeesRationsRefugeesRationsRefugeesRationsRefugeesRations
Lebanon
Syria
Jordan
Gaza
Israel127,600
82,194
506,200
198,227
45,800129,041
82,824
503,423
188,227
45,800106,896
82,861
465,741
199,789
24,380106,068
80,499
444,403
197,233
23,434104,901
84,224
469,576
204,356
19,61699,903
80,674
438,775
198,427
17,176102,095
85,473
475,620
208,560
b97,324
79,819
431,012
199,465
b101,636
86,191
486,631
212,600
b100,056
83,233
443,964
207,034
b
960,021959,315879,667851,637881,673834,955871,748807,620887,058834,287

a The number of rations shown has been corrected to the equivalent number of
full rations, as some registered refugees (children under one year old and in
some areas up to three and a half years old) receive no dry rations and others
(frontier villagers) receive half rations. Before the eighth session of the
General Assembly, children under seven years old and certain Bedouins also
received half rather than full rations.
b No longer under UNRWA responsibility.

Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES ACCORDING TO AGE, SEX AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE AS AT 30
JUNE 1954
0-1 years 1-15 years 15 years and over

Male Female Male Female Male Female

Lebanon ....... 841 694 25,307 22,819 25,628 26,347
Syria ........1,390 1,370 20,412 18,248 21,821 22,950
Jordan ...... 3,307 3,009 122,298 107,947 120,363 129,707
Gaza ....... 2,605 2,422 52,466 46,859 50,143 58,105
TOTAL 8,143 7,495 220,483 195,873 217,955 237,109

ANNEX B
FINANCIAL OPERATIONS

1. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

1. Financial statements for the fiscal year ended 30 June 1954 will be presented
separately, together with the report of the Board of Auditors; they are
therefore not duplicated in the present report. The following comments are,
however, made on the statements:

(a) Statement of assets and liabilities

2. The net assets of the Agency decreased during the financial year by
approximately $5,800,000 as shown below:

30 June 1954 30 June 1953 Decrease
(in millions of US dollars)
Total assets .......... 41.6 46.7 5.1
Less liabilities
and reserves ........ 2.0 1.3 ( .7)

Net assets ............. 39.6 45.4 5.8

3. The decrease in net assets reflects an excess of expenditure over income of
$5,600,000 and an adjustment of $200,000 in working capital.

(b) Income

4. The Agency received no cash for its rehabilitation programme and expenditure
upon rehabilitation was met from its accumulated funds. The total income for the
fiscal year (which was entirely devoted to the relief programme) amounted to
approximately $23,600,000, made up as follows:
(in millions of US dollars)
Cash contributions from Governments ............... 22.6
Contributions in kind from Governments............. 0.4
Contributions from others.......................... 0.2
Miscellaneous income .............................. 0.5

23.7
[i:Less] exchange adjustments ....................... 0.1

TOTAL 23.6

5. The cash contributions from Governments of $22,600,000 were $2,200,000 less
than the amount of such contributions anticipated.

6. The status of pledges as at 30 June 1954 is as follows:

Total pledges
outstanding at
beginning of
year, plus
pledges received
during year,
less withdrawals Received
of pledges during
during Year Balance
Contributor year 1953-1954 expected
(in millions of US dollars)
United States of America.. 45.9 15.0 30.9
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland ................ 14.8 5.0 9.8
France .................. 3.0 1.5 1.5
Host Governments ....... 0.6 0.3 0.3
Other Governments ...... 1.9 1.1 0.8
Other contributors ...... 0.2 0.2 -

TOTAL 66.4 23.1 43.3

7. The figures in the first column of paragraph 6 reflect the fact that during
the year 1953-1954 the United States adjusted downwards its unpaid pledges by
$13,200,000 in accordance with the policy of contributing not more than 70 per
cent of total contributions; also that during the year France reduced its
1952-1953 pledge by $500,000.

8. The major unpaid pledges, those of the United States and the United Kingdom,
represent sums reserved for rehabilitation programme agreements for which cash
has not been required, since specific project agreements have not yet been
signed.

9. No cash pledges were made for 1953-1954 by the host Governments and no cash
payments against unpaid pledges of previous years were received from them.
However, all the host Governments contributed various services, both to the
Agency and direct to the refugees themselves. These included certain hospital
subsidies, port charges, warehousing, porterage, rents of UNRWA offices and camp
sites and transport for supplies, as well as some medical and educational
services.

10. There appears to be an increasing tendency for some of the contributing
Governments to restrict the use of their cash contributions by stipulating that
the contribution must be spent in the country of origin. The Agency endeavours
to arrange this as far as possible, but strict insistence on such a course tends
to handicap UNRWA in its commercial operations and to increase the cost to the
Agency of some commodities above world market prices. It is to be hoped that
such restrictive practices will be withdrawn in the interests of the programme
as a whole.

(c) Expenditure

11. The budgeted expenditure on relief for 1953-1954 was $27,300,000, based upon
the approval by the General Assembly of new cash contributions of $24,800,000.
The actual expenditure was only $23,900,000, or $3,400,000 less than
anticipated. More than half this saving was due to a fall in the prices of basic
subsistence commodities - particularly flour.

12. The expenditure on shelter and hutting was over $1 million less than the
budgeted amount, but this was due to an unavoidable postponement of some of the
construction, and the work and expenditure will be carried over to 1954-1955.
This saving was offset, however, by the fact that nearly $1 million more than
anticipated was required for various accounts, including increased subsidies to
hospitals ($150,000), freight on clothing donations ($260,000) and provision for
terminal payments to area staff ($400,000).

13. The average over-all cost per refugee for relief was approximately $27 per
annum, a remarkably low figure.

14. The budgeted expenditure on rehabilitation, including education, was
$7,800,000 and the actual expenditure $5,300,000. This difference is due largely
to the fact that the amount spent on projects was $2,200,000 less than the
budgeted figure.

2. PROPOSED EXPENDITURE FOR THE YEAR 1954-1955

15. The Agency's detailed plan of expenditure for 1954-1955 and its request for
cash contributions and pledges will be submitted to the General Assembly in a
separate document. The plan is, therefore, only summarized here.

16. The relief programme is budgeted to cost $26,000,000 as compared with an
actual expenditure in 1953-1954 of $23,900,000. The increase over the 1953-1954
figure is to a great extent accounted for by two items: ([i:a]) shelter and camp
maintenance, on which $2,700,000 are budgeted compared with an expenditure of
$1,600,000 in 1953-1954; and ([i:b]) an operational reserve of approximately
$800,000 which is required in part in recognition of the fact that the natural
increase in the population may require rations and services for an additional
number of persons, but also in order to cover other unforeseeable costs. It is
assumed that the same minimum standard of nutrition will continue to apply. If
it were later decided that this standard should be raised somewhat, or that a
clothing issue should be made to refugees (who at present depend entirely on
voluntary contributions of clothing from outside sources), the relief budget
would have to be increased accordingly.

17. The rehabilitation programme is budgeted to cost $36 million, of which $6
million is on projects and activities already in hand (including $3 million on
education) and $30 million is for expenditure on additional project agreements
(i.e., contracts) which it is hoped will be signed during the year. Of this $30
million, $13,200,000 is earmarked for the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley project, and $11
million for the Sinai desert irrigation project; the bulk of the remaining
$5,800,000 being for various training projects and a rehabilitation project
which it is hoped to conclude with the Libyan Government.

3. FINANCING RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
EXPENDITURE

18. The General Assembly, in approving the 1953-1954 relief budget, set a
tentative figure of $18 million as the 1954-1955 requirement. Such a figure was
predicated on the hope that the number of ration recipients would be
substantially reduced from the 1953-1954 figure through rehabilitation
activities. This hope has not been realized and the fact must be faced that it
is not likely to be realized for some years. It is more practical to assume that
for some years to come the cost of relief will run at a figure of about $25
million annually, granted that the present world prices of commodities are
maintained and that the present standard of relief, which is felt to be a
minimum one, is not raised.

19. As at 30 June 1954, the Working Fund of the Agency totalled approximately
$39,500,000, of which $34 million was cash, and the balance ($5,500,000) was
represented principally by inventories, equipment and goods in transit.

20. Of the $34 million in cash, approximately $25,500,000 is reserved for
rehabilitation, leaving $8,500,000 available for relief. With the relief
programme running at a more or less constant level, the size of the inventories
and pipeline supplies will also remain fairly constant, and the cash required
for financing the programme can be assessed in advance and should be in the
Agency's hands in time to place its orders.

21. The General Assembly meets towards the end of the calendar year and the
funds that it authorizes and the cash resulting from the pledges made by
contributing countries are not available to the Agency until well into the
following year. It is obvious, therefore, that the Agency must have in hand at
the beginning of its fiscal year (i.e., 1 July) sufficient cash to finance the
relief programme for, say, eight months -- or, say, some $17 million. Inasmuch
as the actual cash the Agency has in hand for relief at the beginning of the
year 19541955 is $8,500,000 only, it will be clear that towards the end of the
calendar year this sum will have been exhausted, and the relief programme will
then have to be financed by "borrowing" from the funds earmarked for
rehabilitation (the $25,500,000 mentioned above) until the contributions of
Governments are paid. While the rehabilitation programme is in its infancy, this
method of financing relief is quite practicable, although perhaps not entirely
orthodox. When the rehabilitation programme gets into its stride, it may from
time to time require to utilize its "reserve" to the full for its own purposes,
and then to "borrow" from it for relief will not be feasible.

22. This point is brought out to show that at some time in the future (although
not the present year), if the Agency is to be continued, it will be necessary
for it to request the General Assembly to authorize an amount of cash for this
relief working capital fund for a sum of, say, $9 million over and above the
amount requested to cover actual annual expenditure.

23. Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, the Agency could, if it is to be
continued, prepare a provisional budget for 1955-1956 in January 1955. After it
had been agreed by the Advisory Commission, contributing countries could be
requested to advance some 50 per cent of the cash requirements shown in this
provisional budget by 1 July 1955. The final budget would be prepared at the
usual time and presented to the General Assembly at its session towards the end
of 1955. This procedure could be repeated each year during the life of the
Agency.

4.CASH REQUIREMENTS FOR THE YEAR 1954-1955

24. As shown above, relief expenditure is estimated at $26,100,000, of which the
Agency would require $25,600,000 in contributions ($500,000 approximately, it is
assumed, will come from miscellaneous income).

25. As far as rehabilitation is concerned, the Agency expects to spend or
contract $36 million in the fiscal year. The reserve on hand earmarked for
rehabilitation is $25,500,000 and it is believed (particularly in view of the
financing of relief by borrowing from this fund) that this figure should not be
allowed to fall below $15 million.

26. The Agency plans to obtain the balance needed for the rehabilitation
programme, namely $26 million, by calling upon the outstanding pledges as and
when required.

ANNEX C
REHABILITATION

1. Previous annual reports of the Director to the General Assembly have
described the establishment and use of the $200 million rehabilitation fund. It
is a fund distinct from the cash required for the relief of refugees, and is
devoted to the development of projects (including a broad educational programme)
directed towards making self-supporting those refugees who are receiving
rations, so that they no longer will need to be dependent on the Agency's relief
services.

2. These projects are nearly all administered by the Agency's offices in the
various host countries, subject, of course, to control by headquarters; they
are, therefore, described below country by country. One successful project,
however, being of a general nature and operating in more than one country, is
administered by headquarters and is described in this report separately.

1. JORDAN

3. On 12 May 1952, UNRWA signed its first programme agreement. It earmarked the
sum of $11 million from the rehabilitation fund for the purpose of developing
projects in Jordan (apart from any Yarmuk-Jordan Valley development scheme). The
$11 million reservation was to be devoted to all supplementary projects in
Jordan, including general economic and agricultural development, the operation
of the Development Bank of Jordan, and vocational training activities. No
termination date was specified. As of 30 June 1954, $3,687,839
out of the $11 million had been committed for the purposes set forth in the
agreement.

4. On 30 March 1953, the Agency signed a second programme agreement with the
Jordan Government whereby $40 million was earmarked for possible Yarmuk-Jordan
Valley development. The original termination date for the agreement was 30
December 1953, but it has since been extended to 30 June 1955. Specific projects
have been developed out of this agreement for such works as malaria control,
preliminary engineering surveys, the Irbed-Maqarin approach road, soils
analysis, land classification and topographical surveys. As at the end of June
1954, $866,189 had been committed under this agreement.

5. Significant projects in Jordan are described below:

(a) Yarmuk-Jordan Valley Development

6. So far as is known, development of the Jordan Valley by the use of the waters
of the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers offers the best possibility in Jordan for
providing a livelihood for substantial numbers of the refugees in the country.
It has been estimated that the waters of these rivers might irrigate perhaps
460,000 dunums and that this irrigated area might support, through direct and
indirect employment, between 100,000 and 150,000 more people than are now living
in the Jordan Valley. The construction of dams, canals and other works would
also give direct employment to up to 12,000 persons over a period of several
years. UNRWA is therefore conducting, or is assisting in conducting a number of
technical surveys and auxiliary projects which will hasten actual development
operations if and when the considerable political differences at present
delaying exploitation of these rivers are resolved. Among these surveys and
projects are the following:

(I) Engineering survey

7. On 24 June 1953, the Government of Jordan signed a contract with certain
American engineers to survey the Jordan and Yarmuk Valleys with a view to
ascertaining the best sites for dams and for an appropriate network of
irrigation canals, as well as the probable cost of the project. Core drilling
began at the proposed Adasiyeh diversion weir in the fall of 1953; and the
engineers are now studying possible dam sites on the Yarmuk at Maqarin and Wadi
Khalid. The original contract was financed by the United States Operations
Mission to Jordan up to $1 million; by UNRWA up to $290,000; and by the
Jordanian Development Board up to $210,000. Shortly before the close of the
period under review, an additional $400,000 was requested from UNRWA in order to
continue the survey. It is understood that further sums will be requested before
the engineering survey is completed, which, it is estimated, will be the end of
March 1955.

(ii) Approach road

8. Since previous reconnaissance studies had seemed to indicate the probability
of satisfactory dam sites at Maqarin or Wadi Khalid, the Government of Jordan
urged the construction of approach roads to these sites. Under an agreement with
the Government, dated 3 December 1952, UNRWA set aside $515,700 for a road from
Irbed to Maqarin, and approximately $380,000 had been expended by 30 June 1954.
This road is now largely finished and a 25-kilometre offshoot to Wadi Khalid is
also under construction.

(iii) Malaria control

9. Malaria has been the scourge of the area for centuries. Its control is
essential to effective development of the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley. The Agency
agreed with the Government of Jordan in December 1952 to initiate a limited
anti-malaria campaign in the Valley. So successful was this operation that the
Agency now plans to expand the campaign into a five-year programme at a cost of
about $404,000.

10. Agreement has been reached with the Syrian authorities to extend the control
work to both sides of the Yarmuk river. The campaign is directed by an Egyptian
malariologist seconded to the Agency by the World Health Organization. UNRWA
teams, working in close collaboration with the Jordanian Ministry of Health,
have already largely succeeded in eradicating malaria from certain heavily
infested areas. It is expected that the control over the Agency's teams and
their operations will gradually be transferred to the
Ministry of Health so that at the end of the five-year period the Government of
Jordan will have an effective operating staff technically prepared to carry on
permanent control measures.

(iv) Soil survey

11. A land classification and soils analysis of the entire Jordan Valley was
begun in 1953. Now about one-third finished, the survey is scheduled for full
completion by 1 January 1955.

(v) Agricultural survey

12. In order to estimate the economic potential of the Jordan Valley and in
anticipation of the economic problems that might be associated with its
development, UNRWA conducted an agricultural survey of the area that was
scheduled for completion in July 1954. It was found that 93,000 refugees and
53,000 non-refugees were already living in the Jordanian parts of the
Yar-muk-Jordan Valley area. Of the non-refugees, some 20,000 persons were
agricultural owners or agricultural tenants. It was estimated, after
consideration of all the factors involved, that a family might become
self-supporting by the cultivation of an average of twenty irrigated dunums.
Further, agricultural wage labour and other indirect employment would be
generated by the development of the Valley. It appeared, therefore, that a
livelihood might be provided for about one-third of the total refugee population
of Jordan.
(b) Agricultural settlements in Jordan

13. The Agency has completed two agricultural and housing settlements in Jordan
and four others are well on the way.

14. These are as follows:

Actual
Number expenditure
of Total through
family Area estimated 30 June Current
settlers (dunums) cost a 1954 a status
$ $

Beit Qad.... 13 1,330 20,626 19,795 Completed:
(rain-fed) 99 indivi-
duals re-
moved from
ration rolls
September
1952.
Marj Na'ja.. 24 750 125,858 119,699 Completed:
(irrigated) families to
be removed
from ration
rolls July
1954.
Jisr el
Majameh . 40 2,800 4,112 32,155 Houses 100
(rain-fed) per cent
completed.
Hebeileh ... 80 6,870 145,018 91,482 Houses 100
(rain-fed) per cent
completed.
Kalonia .... 18 900 36,554 12,877 Houses 65
(rain-fed) per cent
completed.
Kalandia ... 125 6,400 206,919 -- Houses not
(rain-fed) begun.
TOTAL 300 19,050 599,087 276,008

a Land is to be furnished by the Government of Jordan; the estimates and actual
expenditure include all expenditure made by the Agency on improving the land,
and on houses and equipment.

15. The Beit Qad settlement described in the previous annual report is
progressing satisfactorily.

16. The Marj Na'ja settlement is technically completed; all the settlers are to
be removed from ration rolls in July 1954, and negotiations are now in progress
to transfer administrative responsibility for the project to the Government of
Jordan. The project has thirty-four buildings, now housing twenty-four families,
and two wells producing enough water to irrigate 750 dunums. Each family has
twenty-five irrigated dunums, a house costing about $1,000, mules, sheep and
some farm implements. Crops have been raised in 1952, 1953 and 1954. The net
income per family averaged JD.123 for crops harvested in the spring of 1954, and
a further net income of JD.120 per family is expected for the summer vegetable
crop of 1954. This compares with an average net income per agricultural family
in the Jordan Valley of JD.67 annually.

17. The remaining four projects are financed by UNRWA but are being carried out
by the Government. The land is being surveyed, but in some cases there is doubt
as to the actual amount of land that will be available.

18. Experience in conducting these pilot agricultural settlements points towards
several general conclusions. First, however useful small projects may be in
themselves, they do not have a great effect on the over-all refugee problem.
Cost and other factors indicate that large projects are necessary to cope with
the rehabilitation problem. Secondly, vailability of land and water must be
definitely assured before refugees are placed in a settlement. Otherwise,
uncertainty concerning the amount of land available to each settler may
jeopardize the entire project. Lastly, a careful selection of settlers is a
prerequisite to a successful settlement.

(c) Housing projects

19. Because of the housing shortage in most Jordanian towns shelter represents a
heavy cost element in the budget of refugees who wish to become self-supporting.
The provision of low-cost housing is therefore an urgent necessity. In addition
to the Amman housing scheme, involving fifty houses for 253 ration recipient
refugees, completed in 1952, UNRWA is now planning new low-cost urban housing
for a total of 200 families in Amman, Jerusalem, Hebron and Aqaba. Refugees who
will occupy the houses are those who are already partially self-supporting and
who, with low rents, will become entirely self-supporting and thus removable
from ration rolls. Designs are being drawn and negotiations are under way with
the Government of Jordan for the selection of suitable sites. The houses will be
financed by UNRWA, with the refugees paying nominal rents; the land will be
obtained by the Government.

(d) Ghor Nimrin tent factory

20. Another successful project developed by the Agency was the Ghor Nimrin tent
factory near Jericho. The factory was built with UNRWA rehabilitation funds, at
a cost of $80,000. It was originally built to ensure the supply of the large
number of tents required by the Agency's relief operations. The factory is now
prepared to supply, at competitive costs, tents to other users in the Middle
East. It permanently employs 142 refugees, many of whom had acquired skills in
this line during the time of the British Mandate, and an additional 100 daily
workers when peak orders are received. The refugees receive wages for their work
in the factory, and those whose wages exceed a certain figure have been removed
from the ration rolls. Some of the refugees live in the nearby Ghor Nimrin
housing project, erected by the Government, where they pay nominal rent. Others
live in nearby UNRWA camps or in tents located at the factory.

21. The factory produced more than 6,300 tents in the year ending 30 June 1954.

(e) Development Bank of Jordan

22. The Development Bank of Jordan was established under an agreement between
the Government of Jordan and UNRWA of 8 June 1951, to make long-term loans to
productive enterprises in agriculture and industry that will give employment to
refugees. The authorized capital of the Bank is JD.500,000 ($1,400,000) of which
JD.400,000 is to come from UNRWA, JD.50,000 from the Government and JD.50,000
from commercial banks.
23. The operations of the Bank through the end of its financial year, 31 March
1954, may be summarized as follows:

24. Out of a paid-up capital of JD.311,357 (JD.250,000 by UNRWA, JD.31,350 by
the Government and JD.30,007 by commercial banks in Jordan), 100 loans were
issued in a total amount of JD.258,439. Of these loans eighty-five for
JD.142,987, were for agricultural purposes and fifteen, for JD.115,452, for
industrial purposes.

25. The agricultural loans are granted mainly for long-term development of
privately owned land; they vary in size according to the amount and the quality
of the lands involved. In general, the funds allotted by the Bank are used for
purposes such as terracing, the digging and improving of wells, the construction
or repair of irrigation canals, the building of rainwater cisterns, the purchase
of mechanical equipment, livestock, etc., the planting of fruit trees, the
construction of housing for farm labourers, and so on.

26. The industrial loans include several more important projects (loans over
JD.20,000) as well as smaller ones. In the first category, mention may be made
of a tobacco industry, which received a loan for the purposes of buying
machinery, of increasing its stock of American leaf tobacco and of giving
advances to Jordanian growers of tobacco; the industry was enabled thereby to
expand its business considerably. There is a marble factory which was granted a
loan for the purchase of machinery, of adjacent land, etc., and which now is
producing marble of a remarkably fine quality. A loan was made to a hotel
company to assist in financing the building of a large hotel in Jerusalem
(including the purchase of the required land) to promote the tourist industry.
The smaller projects include a loan to improve a small glass factory in Amman,
so as to enable it to remould broken glass into clear glassware, a loan to

UNWRA :: odds&ends re UNRWA

Author: dajudem
Subject: odds&ends re UNRWA
Posted: Feb 20, 2009 11:38 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

http://middleeastinfo.org/forum497-3
1. NUMBERS AND DISTRIBUTION

12. As of 30 June 1952, almost four years after the cessation of hostilities, there were still on the ration rolls more than 880,000 Palestine refugees scattered over an area of more than 100,000 square miles in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Comparatively few have migrated to Iraq, and some 19,000 remained on the Agency's register in Israel. Those registered by the Agency1 at the end of June 1952 totalled 881,600, a figure almost identical to that of July 1951. These numbers were distributed throughout the host countries2 as follows:

http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/0e598b25ff3267e20525659a00735ea7?OpenDocument

With regards to the UNRWA INTERIM REPORT, the full paragraph is as follows

6. The Agency has accepted as realistic the figures set forth in appendix B of the first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, but recognizes that the numbers have increased in conformity with the extremely high birthrate of the refugees. There is reason to believe that births are always registered for ration purposes, but deaths are often, if not usually, concealed so that the family may continue to collect rations for the deceased. It also is evident that many of the 99,000 mentioned in the above report as "in gainful employment" are now on rations. It is unlikely that numbers will be reduced below 800,000, and it is possible that that number may be exceeded."

Again which site did you get this information from.

-----------------------------------
When the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) was established as a singular, special unit to deal with Arab refugees, practically its first undertaking, in May 1950, was an attempted refugee census to separate the genuinely desperate from the "fradulent claimants." After a year's time and a $300,000 expenditure, UNRWA reported that "it is still not possible to give an absolute figure of the true number of refugees as understood by the working definition of the word" [43] For the purpose of that census, the definition of "refugee" was "a person normally resident in Palestine who had lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the hostilities and who is in need." A reason given by UNRWA for falsified numbers was that the refugees "eagerly report births and ... reluctantly report deaths."

UNRWA, Annual Report of the Director, July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952, General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supp. No. 13 W217 1). See also October 1950, UNRWA Interim Report of Director, A/ 145 1: "there is reason to believe that births are always registered for ration purposes, but deaths are often, if not usually, concealed so that the family may continue to collect rations for the deceased." Cited by Schechtman, Refugee in the World, p. 206.

"One of the camp workers in Lebanon who was questioned about the accuracy of the refugee count answered, We try to count them, but they are coming and going all the time; or we count them in Western clothes, then they return in aba and kafflyah and we count the same ones again.

Cartwright, "Plain Speech," cited by Schechtman, Refugee in the World, pp. 200-201.

UNRWA's relief rolls from the beginning were inflated by more than a hundred thousand,* including those who could not qualify as refugees from Israel even under the newer, unprecedentedly broad eligibility criterion for the refugee relief rolls. UNRWA now altered its definition of "refugees" to include those people who had lived in "Palestine" a minimum of only two years preceding the 1948 conflict." In addition, the evidence of fraud in the count, which accumulated over the years, was given no cognizance toward reducing the UN estimates. They continued to surge."

"UNRWA Director Howard Kennedy on November 1, 1950, reported to the United Nation Ad Hoc Political Committee that "a large group of indigent people totalling over 100,000 ... not be called refugees, but ... have lost their means of livelihood because of the war and post-war conditions ... The Agency felt their need was even more acute than that of the refugees who were fed and housed." In November 1950, Kennedy referred to "the 600,000 [Arab] refugees," although he had reported in May 1950 that UNRWA had distributed 860,000 rations, citing the hundreds of thousands of "hungry Arabs" who were not bona fide refugees but who claimed need.

UN General Assembly, Official Record, 5th session, Ad Hoc Political Committee 31st Meeting, November 11, 1950, p. 194, and Anderson et al, "Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved," p. 26.

According to the Lebanese journal Al-Hayat, in 1959 "Of the 120,000 refugees who entered Lebanon, not more than 15,000 are still in camps."

Schechtman, Refugee in the World, p. 248, citingAl-Hayat (Lebanon), June 25,1959

A substantial de facto resettlement of Arab Palestinian refugees had actually taken place in Lebanon by 1959. Later that year AI-Hayat wrote that "the refugees' inclination-in spite of the noisy chorus all about them-is toward immediate integration."[50] The 1951-1952 UNRWA report itself had determined that "two-thirds of the refugees live elsewhere than in camps," and that "more fortunate refugees are not even on rations, but live rather comfortably ... and work at good jobs."

*******************************************************UNRWA, Annual Report of the Director, July 195 I-June 1952, General Assembly, 7th Session, Supp, No. 13 (A/2171), pp. 3, 10.

The recognition in the United Nations and in Arab journals that the refugee camps had largely been emptied, through absorption and resettlement ' raised appropriate subjects for inquiry with regard to correcting the number of persons receiving rations and seeking "repatriation."

After their 1960 investigation, Senators Gale McGee and Albert Gore reported the surfeit of Ration cards [which] have become chattel for sale, for rent or bargain by any Jordanian, whether refugee or not, needy or wealthy. These cards are used... almost as negotiable instruments.... many have acquired large numbers of ration cards ... rented or bartered to others who unjustifiably receive ... rations, much of which are now in the black market.

At the same time, the UNRWA Director admitted that the Jordan ration lists alone "are believed to include 150,000 ineligibles and many persons who have died." Officials told the two senators of twenty percent to thirty percent inflation of the relief rolls, and an American representative on the UNRWA Advisory Board added, "I have actually seen merchants openly weighing and buying supplies from recipients of distribution centers."

According to the Mideast Mirror, a weekly news review published by Arab News Agency of Cairo: "There are refugees who hold as many as 500 ration cards, 499 of them belonging to refugees long dead.... There are dealers in UNRWA food and clothing and ration cards to the highest bidder.... 'Refugee capitaliste is what UNRWA calls them." July 23, 1955.

In 1961, UNRWA Agency Director John Davis acknowledged that the United Nations refugee counts included "other victims of the conflict of 1948 " and that it would be wrong to deny them aid merely because they weren't legaliy qualified. However, they were persons neglected by their own Arab govern ments, and they should not have been counted among the Arab refugees from Israel; by continuing to be unfaithful to its own mandate, UNRWA contributed to further distortion of an already misrepresented and misunderstood refugee situation. In fact, what were originally intended as humanitarian endeavors to aid needy Arab resident populations by the Red Cross and others would unwittingly contribute to the use of hapless humans for an entire political and military campaign.

"Had the Arabs accepted the 1947 UN resolution, not a single Palestinian would have become a refugee. An independent Arab state would now exist beside Israel. The responsibility for the refugee problem rests with the Arabs."

---------------------------------------------------------

which site did you use for this UNRWA document? I checked the
http://domino.un.org site and the document i got related to this period by the UNRWA does not mention what you have stated in teh above posting? Can you give me a reference to this website you used ? You can double check yourself and see.

this is what i found

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND
WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES

IN THE NEAR EAST

Covering the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952

REFUGEE RELIEF

A. Facts about the refugees

1. NUMBERS AND DISTRIBUTION

12. As of 30 June 1952, almost four years after the cessation of hostilities, there were still on the ration rolls more than 880,000 Palestine refugees scattered over an area of more than 100,000 square miles in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Comparatively few have migrated to Iraq, and some 19,000 remained on the Agency's register in Israel. Those registered by the Agency1 at the end of June 1952 totalled 881,600, a figure almost identical to that of July 1951. These numbers were distributed throughout the host countries2 as follows:

http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/0e598b25ff3267e20525659a00735ea7?OpenDocument

With regards to the UNRWA INTERIM REPORT, the full paragraph is as follows

6. The Agency has accepted as realistic the figures set forth in appendix B of the first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, but recognizes that the numbers have increased in conformity with the extremely high birthrate of the refugees. There is reason to believe that births are always registered for ration purposes, but deaths are often, if not usually, concealed so that the family may continue to collect rations for the deceased. It also is evident that many of the 99,000 mentioned in the above report as "in gainful employment" are now on rations. It is unlikely that numbers will be reduced below 800,000, and it is possible that that number may be exceeded."

Again which site did you get this information from.

----------------------------------------------

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND
WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES

IN THE NEAR EAST
Covering the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952

3. POPULATION DYNAMICS

14. The refugees are not a static group. The natural rate of increase in the refugee population has been estimated as 22,000 individuals per year although, for the reasons stated below, precise figures are unobtainable. Offsetting the rate of increase due to births, re-registrations and new registrations, are ration deductions resulting from other forms of assistance provided by the Agency, from reported deaths, emigration, the acquisition of income and property, false and duplicate registrations, and other reasons. These deductions total 45,800 for the fiscal year just ended.

15. Despite the evidence of statistics, movement occurs; the refugees migrate, often illegally, across frontiers; they emigrate in small numbers to other lands; they get jobs--and some lose them; they go off ration rolls--and some return to them; they are born in great numbers--and they die in lesser numbers. To increase or to prevent decreases in their ration issue, they eagerly report births, sometimes by passing a new-born baby from family to family, and reluctantly report deaths, resorting often to surreptitious burial to avoid giving up a ration card.

http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/0e598b25ff3267e20525659a00735ea7?OpenDocument

Anonymous

posted on 16/9/2003 at 02:46
ALL REFUGEES ARE EQUAL, SOME REFUGEES ARE MORE EQUAL:

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
In more than five decades, the agency has helped an estimated 50 million people restart their lives. Today, a staff of around 5,000 people in more than 120 countries continues to help an estimated 19.8 million persons.
http://www.unhcr.org/
***************************************************UNRWA:
(the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) is a relief and human development agency, providing education, healthcare, social services and emergency aid to over four million refugees living in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab republic.

UNRWA is by far the largest UN operation in the Middle East, with over 24,000 staff, almost all of them refugees themselves, working directly to benefit their communities - as teachers, doctors, nurses or social workers.

-----------------
Say, what was that again? UNHCR serves 20 million people in 120+ countries with 5000 workers.... UNWRA serves 4 million people in 3 + countries with 24,000 staff --almost all of the staff Palies!

1/5 the people served with almost FIVE TIMES the staff??? Maybe our pity for these poor refugees is displaced.!

---------------------------------

So this does not add or substract significantly from the orginial bulk of refugees who fled their homeland. In fact in fact according to UNRWA this is the definition of a palestinian refugee
WHO IS A PALESTINE REFUGEE?
"Under UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees are persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNRWA's services are available to all those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency and who need assistance. UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948. The number of registered Palestine refugees has subsequently grown from 914,000 in 1950 to more than four million in 2002, and continues to rise due to natural population growth.

So Israel is being asked under resolution 194 clause no.15 on reptration of the refugees and its subsequent successive resolutions to take back these original 800,000 AND their descendents which now total in the 2-3 million!
-----------------------------------------------

DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE

15. For working purposes, the Agency has decided that a refugee is a needy person, who, as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood. A large measure of flexibility in the interpretation of the above definition is accorded to chief district officers to meet the many border-line cases which inevitably arise. In some circumstances, a family may have lost part or all of its land from which its living was secured, but it may still have a house to live in. Others may have lived on one side of the boundary but worked in what is now Israel most of the year. Others, such as Bedouins, normally moved from one area of the country to another, and some escaped with part or all of their goods but cannot return to the area where they formerly resided the greater part of the time. These examples give an idea of the varying conditions that must be met in administering the relief programme.

http://domino.un.org/unispalselect.nsf/181c4bf00c44e5fd85256cef0073c426/ec8de7912121fce5052565b1006b5152!OpenDocument

So apparently the definition you quoted is not the whole story because by "A/1451/Rev.1 6 October 1950" it was not necessary to lose one's house, or to even have been a fulltime resident of Israel or even to have lost one's possessions. I guess UNWRA is just a mass of contradictions.

ALL REFUGEES ARE EQUAL, SOME REFUGEES ARE MORE EQUAL:

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
In more than five decades, the agency has helped an estimated 50 million people restart their lives. Today, a staff of around 5,000 people in more than 120 countries continues to help an estimated 19.8 million persons.
http://www.unhcr.org/
***************************************************UNRWA:
(the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) is a relief and human development agency, providing education, healthcare, social services and emergency aid to over four million refugees living in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab republic.

UNRWA is by far the largest UN operation in the Middle East, with over 24,000 staff, almost all of them refugees themselves, working directly to benefit their communities - as teachers, doctors, nurses or social workers.

DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE

15. For working purposes, the Agency has decided that a refugee is a needy person, who, as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood. A large measure of flexibility in the interpretation of the above definition is accorded to chief district officers to meet the many border-line cases which inevitably arise. In some circumstances, a family may have lost part or all of its land from which its living was secured, but it may still have a house to live in. Others may have lived on one side of the boundary but worked in what is now Israel most of the year. Others, such as Bedouins, normally moved from one area of the country to another, and some escaped with part or all of their goods but cannot return to the area where they formerly resided the greater part of the time. These examples give an idea of the varying conditions that must be met in administering the relief programme.

http://domino.un.org/unispalselect.nsf/181c4bf00c44e5fd85256cef0073c426/ec8de7912121fce5052565b1006b5152!OpenDocument

So apparently the definition you quoted is not the whole story because by "A/1451/Rev.1 6 October 1950" it was not necessary to lose one's house, or to even have been a fulltime resident of Israel or even to have lost one's possessions. I guess UNWRA is just a mass of contradictions

UNWRA :: 'UNRWA staff not tested for terror ties'

Author: nobody
Subject: 'UNRWA staff not tested for terror ties'
Posted: Feb 17, 2009 00:09 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

'UNRWA staff not tested for terror ties'
Jan. 31, 2009
Tovah Lazaroff , THE JERUSALEM POST

The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees does little to check whether its staff or clients are terrorists, its former chief attorney, James Lindsay, says in a newly published report.

Allegations linking terrorists to UNRWA are not new. Israel has said many times its troops were fired on by gunmen using UNRWA facilities, that UNRWA vehicles transported weapons and that some of its staff members were terrorists.

UNRWA has denied those charges and Israel has often retracted them or found them hard to prove.

This latest claim against UNRWA, contained in a 67-page critique of the organization published at the end of January by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has more authority behind it, because Lindsay was a senior lawyer for UNRWA from 2000 to 2007.

The issue, Lindsay wrote, is not intention but oversight.

"UNRWA has taken very few steps to detect and eliminate terrorists from the ranks of its staff or its beneficiaries, and no steps at all to prevent members of terrorist organizations such as Hamas from joining its staff," he wrote.

"These failings have occurred not because UNRWA consciously supports terrorism but rather because it is not particularly concerned about the issue. Its main focus [is] the provision of services and protection of Palestinian refugees," he wrote.

UNRWA's Jerusalem spokesman Chris Gunness said in response that his organization had "a rigorous approach to ensuring that its staff are not involved in militant or political activity" and that it took the matter very seriously.

Lindsay wrote that UNRWA did not have the means to ensure there was no terrorism in its midst.

"Even if terrorism constituted a greater concern, the agency is not equipped to undertake the extensive security investigations that a thoroughgoing anti-terrorism effort would require," he said.

Lindsay cited examples of past charges against UNRWA staff, including a 2002 UNRWA driver who was accused - but never charged - with carrying weapons in an ambulance and a Gaza headmaster employed by UNRWA who was also an explosives experts for Islamic Jihad. The headmaster was killed by Israel last year.

UNRWA has no preemployment security checks and does not monitor off-time behavior to ensure compliance with the organization's anti-terrorist rules, Lindsay wrote.

"Evidence of area staff members who have had second jobs with Hamas or with other terrorist groups does occasionally come to light," he wrote.

Even so, Lindsay noted, of the 5,000 UNRWA staff who worked in the West Bank and the 10,000 in the Gaza Strip, most of whom were Palestinians, few had been convicted of terrorism-related charges.

Staff members, however, had been involved in political activity, wrote Lindsay. In particular he quoted the organization's past commissioner-general Peter Hansen, who in 2004 said, "I am sure there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll and I don't see that as a crime. Hamas as a political organization does not mean that every member is a militant and we do not do political vetting and exclude people from one persuasion as against another."

UNRWA has said in response that its staff were prohibited from any political involvement.

The bulk of Lindsay's report, however, focused on operational suggestions to de-politicize and change the organization's mission and to cut down on its list of 4.5 million refugees.

UNRWA was created in 1949 by General Assembly Resolution 302 and began operation in May 1950 to service what at the time was 957,000 refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, many of whom been rendered homeless or jobless by the 1948-49 war with Israel, according to Lindsay.

That number was higher than the initial UN list of 726,000 refugees recorded in the immediate aftermath of the war, he wrote.

Initially, UNRWA provided immediate relief with an aim to integrate the refugees into their host countries.

Both the refugees and the Arab states opposed the idea of integration. By the late 1950s it had been disregarded in favor of servicing the refugees, including offering developmental services in areas such as education, health, welfare, microfinance and urban planning.

UNRWA also expanded its definition of a refugee to include those patrilineal descendants of the original refugees.

Since the 1970s, more than half of the organization's budget has gone to education. In 2007, for example, $282 million of UNRWA's $545m. budget went to educate 480,000 children, according to Lindsay.

Similarly, 21,962 of its 29,000 staff members work in UNRWA schools. Fifteen percent to 20% of its budget goes to health services, for which $106m. was earmarked in the 2007 budget.

But not all those serviced by UNRWA need the organization, Lindsay wrote in his study, particularly given that a majority of them have been resettled.

In Jordan, where 2 million Palestinian refugees live, all but 167,000 have citizenship, and are fully eligible for government services including education and health care.

To continue to call citizens of recognized states refugees is suspect and suggests "that the agency's continued existence is due at least in part to political purposes" even though UNRWA was not designed as a political organization, Lindsay said.

Eliminating UNRWA services in Jordan to all but the 167,000 noncitizens could reduce its refugee list by 40%, Lindsay said.

In deciding to whom UNRWA provides services, it assesses "refugee status," not need, he wrote.

Some recipients of aid could afford to pay for the services they now received for free, he wrote.

The decision to allow for a growing refugee population had become a political statement that fostered and supported the Palestinian demand to return to Israel, he wrote.

UNRWA, he said, did this even though the United States, its largest single donor, did not support the right of Palestinian return to within Israel's pre-1967 border.

While some critics have demanded that the organization be disbanded, Lindsay called for it to be reformed. UNRWA's programs, he said, had insured that the population it serviced did not suffer from lack of basic needs.

As a large donor, the US should do more to push for changes within UNRWA, including a return to a needs-based operation, he said.

It should ask that its staff stop making "one-sided political statements" and limit themselves to comments on humanitarian issues.

A better system to check staff and clients needed to be installed, and it needed to better define its policy against "terrorism," he said.

Textbooks used in UNRWA schools had improved but should be provided by a neutral body like the United Nations rather than by the local governments, and an independent monitoring group should be established to examine the teachers' work, he said.

Gunness said Lindsay's study was inaccurate and misleading.

"The life-saving, human value of UNRWA's work was in evidence during the recent Gaza conflict, as it has been in previous crises for the past 60 years.

"This work has made a positive difference in Palestinian lives not only in the occupied Palestinian territory, but also across the Middle East," the UNRWA spokesman said.

The article "makes selective use of source material and fails to paint a truthful portrait of UNRWA and its operations today... and does not detail the organizations three year process of reform," he said.

"The article also avoids highlighting the many relevant aspects of UNRWA's rules and management practice," Gunness said.

Lindsay, he said, knew these facts but avoided presenting them.

"For all these reasons, UNRWA rejects the article and its findings and is preparing a detailed response to it," Gunness said.
This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304645372&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull
[ Back to the Article ]
Copyright 1995- 2009 The Jerusalem Post - http://www.jpost.com/

UNWRA :: Fixing UNRWA by James G. Lindsay

Author: nobody
Subject: Fixing UNRWA by James G. Lindsay
Posted: Feb 15, 2009 10:57 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN's Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees
James G. Lindsay

Format: Softcover, 80 Pages
Published: January 2009

Price: $0.00

UNRWA -- is it part of the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict or part of the problem?

The humanitarian aspect of the recent conflict between Israel and Hamas has cast a fresh spotlight on the presence in Gaza of the nearly sixty-year-old United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), raising important questions about why the UN still operates schools, hospitals, and clinics for "refugees" six decades after the partition of Mandatory Palestine.

UNRWA began providing assistance to Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in May 1950, in the wake of the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli war. Since then, the organization has survived wars, coups, uprisings, and, in Gaza and the West Bank, even the creation of the first-ever Palestinian governing body -- the Palestinian Authority -- which operates in parallel with, not in place of, UNRWA institutions.

Over the course of its long history, UNRWA has rarely been the subject of comprehensive external evaluation, and virtually nothing has been written on the organization's strategy and operations by a senior staff member with knowledge of how UNRWA actually works.

This path-breaking study by James G. Lindsay, UNRWA's former general counsel, offers one of the first insider accounts of the organization. In it, Lindsay analyzes the agency's evolution over the past half century, evaluates recent criticisms of its operations, and recommends bold new policies for the U.S. government -- UNRWA's largest single-country donor -- that will help repair an aid and relief system that has strayed from its original mission.

� 2009 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Documents :: Operation Cast Lead and International Law Strategic Assessme

Author: nobody
Subject: Operation Cast Lead and International Law Strategic Assessme
Posted: Feb 09, 2009 09:11 (GMT -5)
Topic Replies: 0

Operation Cast Lead and International Law Strategic Assessment Volume 11, No. 4, February 2009
Sabel, Robbie

A combination of factors has led to particular interest in issues of international law in the study of Operation Cast Lead. These factors include the amorphous political status of the Gaza Strip; the problem of application of the rules of war to asymmetrical warfare between a modern military and urban guerrillas; the role of the UN Security Council; the involvement of European and other states in attempts to resolve the dispute; the intensive involvement of NGOs in Gaza; the widespread coverage by the international press and particularly Arab TV; the increasing involvement of judicial discourse in Israeli society and the IDF; and attempts by Palestinian organizations and their supporters to brand Israel's campaign and tactics as illegal.

The article that follows reviews several international law issues that are particularly related to the operation in Gaza.

Self Defense against Urban Guerrillas

International law and the UN Charter recognize the inherent right of states to use force in self defense against an armed attack. The right applies even if the attack is by irregular forces. Following 9/11, the UN Security Council explicitly recognized the right of states to self defense against terrorist attacks. However, if the area from where the attack occurred is under the military occupation of the state being attacked, then it could be argued that the applicable law is that of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals with the rights of the occupying power to arrest and take legal action against violators of the law. If Gaza was under Israeli military occupation prior to the campaign, then Israel, according to this argument, should have simply arrested the Hamas rocket firing teams.

Occupation, however, requires effective control; only then do the laws of occupation apply. Clearly there was not sufficient Israeli control, if control at all, to allow police type actions. The legal status of Gaza is not clear and in the absence of effective control and ability to carry out police type actions, Israel correctly invoked its right to use force in self defense against attacks emanating from Gaza. The applicable law is thus the law of armed conflict.

Proportionality in the Use of Force?

To justify the claim of self defense, the use of force must be in proportion to the attack. A minor border incident does not warrant a full armed conflict in response. Proportionality can be measured not only against an individual attack but against an accumulation of attacks if they were part of a pattern. Regarding Operation Cast Lead, the Hamas attack by thousands of rockets clearly justified a response of armed attack.

Once parties are in armed conflict, the rule of proportionality is no longer applicable or relevant, except as regards civilian casualties. The rules of war do not impose a game type of equilibrium. In an armed conflict a party is entitled to use superior force to destroy the enemy's armed forces and military capabilities and not only to respond in kind. The UN Security Council authorized the US and its allies to defeat Saddam Hussein's military, not just to force it to vacate Kuwait. An aggressor state or organization must take into account that it is liable to meet a potential victim state that will use "disproportionate force" to defend itself.

Application of Laws of War to an Asymmetrical Conflict

Hamas has not denied that its attacks were targeted at Israeli towns; such attacks are a violation of the laws of war. Furthermore Hamas used civilians to shield its combatants, which is also a violation of the laws of war. There are reports that the Hamas leadership headquarter was located in the basement of a hospital, a further egregious violation. Reciprocity, which is normally an essential element of international law, did not exist in this conflict. Nevertheless, the IDF correctly saw itself as being bound by the laws of war in its conduct, notwithstanding the total disregard of these rules by its opponents.

Civilian Casualties

Where combat takes place in a built up area, civilian casualties are a tragic but inevitable consequence of a military operation. International law obligates that if there are civilians close to military targets, efforts must be made to minimize civilian casualties, and the civilian casualties may not be disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. Hamas frequently fired from civilian areas. In the Gaza operation, the IDF repeatedly warned civilians of impending attacks, using leaflets and mass telephone messages. Civilian casualties apparently constituted about one third to one half of all casualties. It does not appear that any other military has ever taken such steps to minimize civilian casualties, nor is there any other similar conflict on record in a built up area where the percentage of civilian casualties in relation to combatant casualties was lower than in Operation Cast Lead.

Civilian Targets

A civilian target, including a mosque (or church or synagogue) that is used for military purposes such as storing weapons and ammunition, loses its immunity from attack and becomes a legitimate target. Any other rule would lead to granting an illogical advantage to an enemy hiding weapons in such a building. Israel had information that a certain hospital was used for hiding the leading staff of Hamas. Nevertheless Israel refrained from attacking the hospital because of the civilian casualties that would be caused by such an attack. The civilian police in itself not a military target, but where the police is part of the military establishment, as it was under Hamas, it becomes a legitimate target.

Phosphorous Shells

Like every military in the world, Israel uses phosphorous shells in flares and smoke shells, and for marking targets. Such shells are standard equipment in all NATO militaries as well as the Arab states' armed forces. They are of course dangerous to handle when burning but absolutely legal. The International Committee of the Red Cross has confirmed that there was no evidence that these shells were used in Gaza in any irregular way.

Supplies to the Civilian Population n Gaza

Classic laws of law permitted total embargos, as was done during the Second World War. Modern laws prohibit starvation of civilians as a means of warfare. Israel took the unprecedented step of allowing the large scale delivery of food and medical supplies from its territory into Gaza while actual fighting continued. Furthermore, Israel applied a unilateral ceasefire of some three hours every day to ensure distribution of such food and medicine.

Iranian Responsibility

A state selling weapons is not normally legally responsible for the results of their use. However, Iran trained Hamas operatives and financed and supplied rockets to Hamas, knowing that the rockets were to be used against civilian targets. This could well entail legal responsibility by Iran for the actions of Hamas.

Conclusion

The principal legal criticism of Israeli tactics in Operation Cast Lead appears to revolve around the issue of proportionality. It could be questioned what is a proportionate response to an attack of some four thousand Hamas rockets targeted at civilian towns over a period of three years. Beyond that, however, it is relevant to emphasize that once armed conflict develops, international law does not require proportionality of response. A state defending itself may indeed strive to cause disproportionate damage to its enemy's military targets and military capabilities. Let the attacking state or organization beware.

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Documents :: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incen

Author: nobody
Subject: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incen
Posted: Jan 23, 2009 09:40 (GMT -5)
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Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III). Geneva, 10 October 1980.
Full text [Display Introduction] [Display articles]
Article 1
Definitions

For the purpose of this Protocol:
1. "Incendiary weapon" means any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target. (a) Incendiary weapons can take the form of, for example, flame throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances.
(b) Incendiary weapons do not include:
(i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems;
(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.
2. "Concentration of civilians" means any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads.
3. "Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
4. "Civilian objects" are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 3.
5. "Feasible precautions" are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.

Article 2
Protection of civilians and civilian objects

1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.
3. It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives.

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WWII :: Mid-Range Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century

Author: nobody
Subject: Mid-Range Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century
Posted: Jan 06, 2009 23:01 (GMT -5)
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Mid-Range Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century
List of Recurring Sources

Alphabetical Index

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These cost more lives than the American losses in Vietnam (58,135), but not as many lives as five years of murder in America (119,700 killed 1990-94). Or another way of looking at it, each atrocity on this page killed roughly the same number of people as a single year of medical mistakes in the USA (44,000 to 98,000).

Dutch East Indies, Aceh War (1873-1914): 70 000
Clodfelter
Dutch: 2,317 KIA + ten times that to disease
Atjeh people lost 11,187 (1904-1907)
Hans Bakker [http://www.uoguelph.ca/~vincent/hbakker/war.htm]
Dutch: 7,700 officers and soldiers died in battle or disease
Schulten estimates 2,267
Zentgraaf est. 7,707
Acehnese guerilla fighters: 30,000-100,000, died of battle or diseases
Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901): 115 000
Rummel:
War: 10,000
Democide: 105,000
TOTAL: 115,000
Hammond: In North China, 32,000 Chinese Christians killed, plus 200 missionaries.
Small & Singer, battle deaths:
China: 2000
Japan: 622
Russia: 302
UK: 34
France: 24
USA: 21
TOTAL: 3,003
Eckhardt: 13,000 civ. + 3,000 mil. = 16,000
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902): 75 000
Pakenham, Thomas, The Boer War (1979):
British killed in battle: 5,774 k
British died of disease or wounds: 16,168
Black auxilaries killed: 2,000
Boers killed: 7,000
White civilians died in camps: 18-28,000
Blacks dead in camps: 12,000
[TOTAL: 66,000 � 5,000]
Gilbert: 28,000 whites and "more than" 50,000 blacks died in the camps.
Encarta
British: 28,000
Boers: 4,000
Civilians died in camps: 20,000
[TOTAL: 52,000]
Steve Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture: Civil and Military Worlds (2003):
British killed in battle: 7,792 kia
British died of disease: 13,250
Boers killed: 6,000
White women and children in camps: 26,370 died
Blacks dead in camps: 14,154 "official figure ... now known to be wrong"; actually >20,000
[TOTAL: >73,412]
Trager, People's Chronology: 20,000 Boer women & children d. in camps.
Singer: 22,000 UK
Eckhardt: 13,000 civ. + 22,000 mil. = 35,000
COWP: 22,000 UK; 35,000 total
AWM: 606 Australian deaths
Colombia (1899-1902): 100 000
War of a Thousand Days:
Britannica: 60-130,000
Encarta: 60-130,000
Small & Singer: 100,000
Dict.Wars: 100,000
Eckhardt: 75,000 civ. + 75,000 mil. = 150,000
Somalia, Mohammed Abdulla Hasan (1899-1920): 100 000
Mad Mullah Jihad
According to the Library of Congress [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html], this war caused the deaths of about one third of the northern Somali population. The 1911 Britannica estimates 300,000 people in British Somaliland, so the death toll might have been something like 100-150,000. (depending on whether the 300000 was estimated before or after the one-third had died)
By summing the battle casualties in the campaigns that are descibed in the OnWar.com essay for the 1899-1905 phase of the war, I determined that the dervishes suffered some 11,700 casualties (K+W) fighting the British, which would come to around 3,000 KIA, plus another 1,000 killed in battle with the Abyssinians. The British lost something over 200 KIA.
Russia (1900-17): 95 000
Romanov Regime:
Rummel blames Tsar Nikolai for 1,070,000 democides; however, his evidence is (by his own admission) not as solid as he would like, so take this number with a grain of salt. Also, 975,000 of these would be included among the dead from the First World War (many -- 400T -- being mistreated POWs, along with 75T Turks/Kurds massacred, 83T German deportees dead, etc.) so we only have some 95,000 democides which occurred independently of WW1. Some 2,000 of these were killed in Jewish pogroms.
Eckhardt, civil conflicts in 1905-06:
Pogrom, Russians vs Jews: 2,000
Peasants & Workers vs Govt: 1,000
James Trager, The People's Chronology (1992): Pogroms in Russia kill some 50,000 Jews by 1909 ("1905")
OnWar.com: Pogroms in Russia (1903) k. 50,000 Jews
NOTE: I can't find supporting evidence for these high numbers killed in the pogroms. Most individual events seem to have killed dozens, and very occasionally hundreds.
"In the famous pogrom of Kishinev in 1903, there were 49 Jewish deaths out of a Jewish population of about 50,000; in Bialystok in 1906, 70 deaths out of about 48,000 Jews." (http://www.west.net/~jazz/felshtin/redcross.html)
"During 1903 and 1904, 45 pogroms occurred, 95 Jews and 13 non-Jews were killed, and 4,200 people were severely injured." (http://www.factsofisrael.com/blog/archives/000418.html)
Herero War, German Southwest Africa (1904-07): 75 000
1911 Britannica: 5,000 Germans, 20-30,000 Herero
T. Packenham, The Scramble for Africa (1991): The Nama population was reduced by 10,200 (from 20,000 to 9,800), the Herero by 65,000 (from 80,000 to 15,000).
Mark Cocker, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold (1998): 75,000 Africans
Eckhardt: 80,000 civilians
Robert Edgerton, The Fall of the Asante Empire: 1,400 Germans KIA
Russo-Polish War (1918-1920): 100 000
Singer
USSR: 60,000
Poland: 40,000
TOTAL: 100,000
Eckhardt: 100,000
Urlanis calculates 37,000 Poles KIA, and cites...
Polish official commission:
killed: 17,278 (Urlanis: "underestimation")
dead: 30,337
missing: 51,374
Morocco (1921-26) 68 000
War in the Rif
Eckhardt: 11,000 civ. + 29,000 mil. = 40,000
Small & Singer, partial
Spain: 4,000
France: 25,000
Moroccans: unknown
Stanley Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (1967):
KIA from 1916 to 1927: 17,082 Spanish + 2,394 Regulares (Moors serving Spain, partial count)
Clodfelter
French: 10,000 d. all causes
Spain: 50,000 d. all causes
Rif rebels: 30,000 killed and wounded
[TOTAL: ca. 67,500]
OnWar.com
Berbers: 5,000
France: 16,000
Spain: 15,000
TOTAL: 36,000
Manchuria (1931-33): 60 000
Singer:
Japan: 10,000
China: 50,000
TOTAL: 60,000
Eckhardt: 60,000
Chaco War (1932-35): 100 000
Dictionary of 20C World History
Bolivia: 50,000
Paraguay: 35,000
TOTAL: 85,000
Bruce Farcau, The Chaco War (1991), deaths from all causes
Bolivia: 50,000
Paraguay: 40,000
TOTAL: 90,000
Marley
Bolivia: 57,000
Paraguay: 36,000
TOTAL: 93,000
Our Times: 100,000
Clodfelter
Paraguay
KIA: 12,000
Disease: 36,000
Bolivia: 52,397, incl...
KIA: 25,000
Died as POWs: 4,264
[TOTAL: 100,397]
Small & Singer
Bolivia: 80,000
Paraguay: 50,000
TOTAL: 130,000
John Gunther, Inside Latin America: 135,000
Eckhardt: 70,000 civ. + 130,000 mil. = 200,000
Israel (1948 et seq.): 65 000
Israel has been almost continuously at war throughout its existence. Here's the tally:
Wars:
War of Independence, 1948
Singer:
Israel: 3,000
Egypt: 2,000
Syria: 1,000
Jordan: 1,000
Iraq: 500
Lebanon: 500
TOTAL: 8,000
Eckhardt: 8,000
B&J
Jewish military: 4,000
Jewish civilians: 2,000
8,000 Arabs
TOTAL: 14,000
WPA3
Israel: 6,000
Arabs: 15,000
TOTAL: 21,000
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("Israel MFA"): 6,373 Israelis KIA [http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00us0]
5 March 1991 AP
Israel: 6,200
Arabs: 2,000 regular soldiers + thousands irregulars
[MEDIAN TOTAL: 8,200]
Suez War, 1956
WPA3
Egypt: 1,650
Israel: 189
UK: 22
France: 10
TOTAL: 1,871
5 March 1991 AP
Egypt: 2,000-3,000
Israel: 172
UK, France: 82
TOTAL: 2,254 to 3,254
Hartman:
Egypt: 2500-3000
Israel: 181
UK, France: 32
TOTAL: 2,713 to 3,213
Eckhardt: 1,000 civ. + 3,000 mil. = 4,000
Israel MFA: 231 Israelis KIA
[MEDIAN TOTAL: 2,800]
Six Day War, 1967
Singer
Egypt: 10,000
Syria: 2,500
Jordan: 6,100
Israel: 1,000
TOTAL: 19,600
5 March 1991 AP
Egypt: 11,500
Jordan: 6,094.
Syria: 1,000
Israel: 777
TOTAL: 19,371
Hartman
Egypt: 10-15,000
Syria: 1,000
WPA3
Arabs: 4,000
Israel: 983
TOTAL: 4,983
B&J
Israel: 700
Arabs: 25,000 "casualties"
Israel MFA: 776 Israelis KIA
Israeli Defense Force [http://www.idf.il/english/history/born4.stm]
Jordan: 800 KIA
Egypt: 15,000
Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, which would be 1996
Israel: 759
[MEDIAN TOTAL: ca. 16,600]
Israeli-Egyptian War, 1967-70
Singer:
Israel: 368
Egypt: 5000
TOTAL: 5,368
5 March 1991 AP: 721 Israelis
Israel MFA: 1,424 Israelis KIA
Eckhardt: 50,000 civ. + 25,000 mil. = 75,000 (incl. 6-Day War). [Without supporting evidence, I doubt 50T civilian deaths]
[MEDIAN TOTAL: ca. 6,400]
Yom Kippur War, 1973
WPA3
Egypt: 5,000
Syria: 3,000
Israel: 2,812
Other Arab: 340
TOTAL: 11,152
B&J
Egypt: 5,000
Syria: 3,000
Israel: 3,000
Iraq: 200
TOTAL: 11,200
Sachar:
Egypt: 7,700
Syria: 3,500
Israel: 2,552
TOTAL: 13,752
Eckhardt: 16,000
Singer:
Egypt: 5,000
Syria: 8,000
Israel: 3,000
Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia: 401
TOTAL: 16,401
5 March 1991 AP
Egypt: 15,000
Syria: 3,500
Israel: 2,569
Iraqi: 125
TOTAL: 21,194
Israel MFA: 2,688 Israelis KIA
[MEDIAN TOTAL: ca. 14,900]
TOTAL for these wars:
Israel: 6,800-11,100
Egypt: 23,700-40,000
Syria: 5,000-11,500
Jordan: 7,100
TOTAL: Adding the above gives us 43,000 to 70,000 military (and up to 51,000 civilians, but we only have Eckhardt's estimates on this.) Other estimates for the total:
[TOTAL of MEDIANS, above: ca. 48,900]
CDI: 125,000 deaths (1948-97)
Ploughshares 2000: >100,000 in 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars. Plus, 12,000 people, including 500 Israelis, during 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon
Israel MFA: 20,093 Israelis KIA through 1997
Civil Strife:
Israel vs. Palestinians:
SIPRI 1997: 13,000 killed (1948-96)
B'Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in The Occupied Territories [http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Total_Casualties.asp] 9 Dec 1987-May 2003 (cross-ethnic killings only)
In Occupied Territories
Palestinians: 3544
Israelis: 532
In Israel
Palestinians: 106
Israelis: 610
TOTAL
Palestinians: 3650
Israelis: 1142
TOTAL: 4792
1st Intifada:
28 May 1992 [Glasgow] Herald: since Dec. 1987
904 Palestinians k by Israelis
88 Israelis k by Palestinians
473 Arabs k by Palestinians
TOTAL: 1,465
9 Dec 1992 Irish Times: since Dec. 1987
1,121 Palestinians k by Israelis
103 Israelis k by Palestinians
535 Arabs k by Palestinians
TOTAL: 1,759
2nd Intifada:
1 Oct. 2001 Chicago Tribune: about 650 Palestinians + 170 Israelis since 28 Sept 2000
Ploughshares 2000: >1,500
East Germany (1949-89): 100 000
Communist Regime
27 Oct. 1991 LA Times: 100,000 died in captivity or were executed for political offenses in E.G. (citing an official report by the unified German govt.)
27 Oct 1991 Independent (London): 100,000 d., incl. 65,000 in or on way to post-war Soviet camps.
Rummel: 70,000 democides, 1948-87
9 April 1990 UPI: 90,000 (acc. to Association for the Victims of Stalinism) or 56,000 (other sources) Germans k./d in Soviet detention camps after WW2. Mostly hunger.
23 June 1991 Chicago Tribune: 40,000 German political prisoners d. in Soviet-run camps after WW2
WHPSI: 6,162 political executions, 1948-52
12 Aug 2004 Agence France Presse: 1,065 died fleeing E. Germany; 227 died in Berlin, 190 after the construction of the Wall.
Congo Crisis (1960-64): 100 000
WHPSI: 14,003 deaths by political violence, 1958-67.
Dan Smith (1997): 100,000 killed in 1960 war.
Eckhardt: 100,000
Singer: 100,000, plus 50 Belgians (1960-67)
B&J: 110,000 (1960-64)
Dunnigan (1991): 100,000 to 110,000
Peter Forbath (The River Congo (1977)): at least 200,000
Iraq (1960s)
Govt. vs. Kurds
Eckhardt: 100,000 civ. + 5,000 mil. = 105,000 (1961-70)
B&J
1961-66: 10,000
1968-70: 2,000
TOTAL: 12,000
Angola (1961-75): 80 000
Anti-colonial war
Dunnigan (1991): 120,000
Hartman:
4,000 Portuguese
25,000 insurgents
50,000 civilians
TOTAL: 79,000 "casualties" (killed only?)
Eckhardt: 30,000 civ. + 25,000 mil. = 55,000
WHPSI (1958-77): 43,337
Atrocities:
Dict.Wars: 20,000 Africans k. in 1961 revolt.
Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm : Angola's People: 300 Europeans k. by Kongo; 20-30,000 Africans k. by Portuguese, 1961
Hartman: 7,000 massacred by UPA Guerillas; 30,000 massacred in retaliation, 1961
Harff & Gurr: 40,000 Kongo, Assimilados were victims of repressive politicide, 1961-62
Mozambique, Anti-colonial war (1961-75)
Hartman:
3,500 Portuguese
10,000 FRELIMO
50,000 civilians
TOTAL: 63,500
Eckhardt: 30,000
WHPSI: 4,625 (1958-75)
North Yemen (1962-70): 100 000
1984 World Almanac: 150,000
Singer: 100,000 (plus 1,000 Egyptians)
Eckhardt: 101,000
B&J: 100,000 (incl. 1,000 Egyptians + 1,000 Saudis, 1962-67)
5 March 1991 AP: 70,000
Nicaragua (1972-91): 60 000
Sandanista Rebellion (1972-1979)
WPA3: 10,000
30,000 (Britannica)
35,000 (Singer)
Eckhardt: 25,000 civ. + 10,000 mil. = 35,000
40,000 (Our Times)
50,000 (Chomsky 1987)
MEDIAN: 30,000
Contra Rebellion (1981-90): 30 000
WPA3: 10,000
B&J: 25,000 (1980-95)
30,000 (Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1990)
Dict.Wars: 30,000
Eckhardt: 15,000 civ. + 15,000 mil. = 30,000 (to 1987)
30,000 (1990 SIPRI)
57,000: (Chicago Tribune, 27 July 1989)
MEDIAN: 30,000
Philippines (1972- )
Guerrilla Wars
29 Jan. 2003 Philippine Daily Inquirer: Killed in Communist rebellion, AFP Intelligence Service report:
Government forces: 9,867 (1971-2002)
Communist rebels: 22,799 (1971-2002)
Civilians: 10,672 (crossfire, 1969-2002)
Total: 43,338
1990 SIPRI: 50,000 (Moro insurrection, Mindinao: 1975-1986)
1992 War Annual: 50,000
B&J: 60,000, Mindinao, 1970-95
Eckhardt (1972-87)
vs. Muslims: 20,000 civ. + 15,000 mil. = 35,000
vs. Communists: 20,000 civ. + 15,000 mil. = 35,000
TOTAL: 70,000
CDI: 75,000 (Govt. vs. New People's Army and National Liberation Front: 1969-97)
Ploughshares 2000
Mindinao: 100,000-150,000 since 1971
vs. NPA: 25,000 since 1969
TOTAL: 150,000 � 25,000
D.Smith (1991): 80,000 ("20 years")
Dictionary of 20C World History: 120,000 (Moro insurrection, Mindinao: 1969-1996)
Colombia (1970s, 1980s, 90s): 45 000
Govt vs Communist guerrillas
Before 1990
27 July 1989 Chicago Tribune: 50,000 to 1989
(War Annual 4): 70,000 killed, 1973-89
Dictionary of 20C World History: 80,000 (vs. drug cartels, 1986-90)
After 1990
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 45,000 since 1986
Ploughshares 2000: 40,000 since 1990
28 June 2001, Xinhua News Agency: 40,000 in past decade
August 2000 International Enforcement Law Reporter: 35,000 civilian deaths and disappearances since 1987
20 January 2002 Austin American Statesman: 35-40,000 in past decade.
16 Dec. 1999 NY Times: 35,000 in last 10 years
Washington Post (15 Jan. 1996): 17,000 deaths, 1990-94, acc2 to a report by the [Colombian] National Planning Dept.
Whole length
1 July 2001, Xinhua News Agency: 200,000 k over 37 yrs
20 January 2002 Austin American Statesman: ca 200,000
Agence France Presse
6 May 2002: some 200,000 deaths in almost 4 decades
2 August 2001: 200,000 in 37 yrs
6 Sept. 2000: 120,000 deaths in 4 decades
13 July 1999, The Times [London]: 50,000 in 3 decades
[MEDIAN: ca. 45,000]
10 September 2001 UPI: >40,000 in 37 yrs.
16 Jan. 2000 Toronto Star: 35,000 in 30+ years
17 Jan. 2000 Independent [London]: 30,000 in 35 years
B&J: 30,000 (1965-95)
El Salvador (1979-92): 75 000
Govt. vs. guerrillas
Total Deaths:
Britannica: 70,000
24 Dec. 1989 Arizona Republic: 71,000
Clodfelter: 73,000, incl. 60,000 civilian (to 1990)
B&J: 75,000
Compton's: 75,000
Encarta: 75,000
Our Times: 75,000
Dict.Wars: 80,000
Disappearances (included above): 9,000 (Grenville)
Murders: 30,000 (1979-81, Chomsky (1987))
Sierra Leone (1991-2002): 75 000
Gov't vs. Revolutionary United Front
B&J: 100,000 (1991-95)
SIPRI 1997: over 3,000
CDI: 30,000 (1989-97)
29 April 1999 AP: 14,000
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 15,000 (1991-96); 500,000 to 1999
Ploughshares 2000: 20-50,000
27 June 2000 USA Today: perhaps as high as 75,000
18 May 2000 The Times [London]: 75,000
7 May 2003 Agence France Presse: 200,000
7 Oct. 2004 CNN: 50,000
[MEDIAN: ca. 75,000]
Algeria (1992-2002): 100 000
Fundamentalist Moslem Insurrection, govt. vs. FIS and GIA:
CDI: 75,000 (1992-97)
Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1998: 75,000
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 80,000
Dict.Wars (1999): 70,000
Ploughshares 2000: 100,000
New York Times: 60-70,000 (15 Jan. 1998); 100,000 (27 Jan. 2000)
26 June 2003 Agence France Presse: 100,000+
8 April 2004 Guardian: up to 150,000
Eritrea-Ethiopia War (1998-2000) 70 000
FAS 2000: 40,000 soldiers KIA
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 50,000
9 June 2000 Chicago Tribune: 70,000
21 Dec 2005 BBC: 80,000
Ploughshares 2000: 70-120,000 mil. + civ.

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WWII :: DeathTolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the 20th cen

Author: nobody
Subject: DeathTolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the 20th cen
Posted: Jan 06, 2009 22:59 (GMT -5)
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Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century
List of Recurring Sources

Alphabetical Index

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Growing up in the South, I heard over and over again that nobody in the history of the world suffered as much as the Southern people during the American Civil War. The following events, however, all killed more people than the American Civil War, which cost approximately 620,000 lives.

Congo Free State (1886-1908): 8 000 000 [make link]
This is probably the least publicized megadeath of the 20th Century. A lot of natives died from colonial brutality, but no one really knows how many.
Roger Casement's original 1904 report estimated that as many as 3 million Congolese had died of disease, torture or shooting since 1888 (cited in Gilbert's History of the Twentieth Century; also in Colin Legum, Congo Disaster (1972)).
Peter Forbath (The River Congo (1977)): at least 5 million killed.
John Gunther (Inside Africa (1953)): 5-8 million deaths.
Adam Hochschild (Leopold's Ghost, (1998)): 10 million, or half the original population.
Britannica, "Congo Free State": population declined from 20 or 30 million to 8 million.
Fredric Wertham A Sign For Cain : A Exploration of Human Violence (1966): the population of the Congo dropped dropped from 30M to 8.5M, a loss of 21.5 million
Rummel:
2,150,000 democides, 19th Century (based on 10% of Wertham)
25,000 democides, 1900-1910.
AVERAGE:
Median: ca. 8M
Mean: ca. 8.5M
NOTE: Because this event began in 1886, it tend to get relegated to the 19th Century; however, 40% of it occured in the 20th Century, so we need to keep this in mind when splitting the death toll into century-based subtotals. Also, it took awhile for the atrocities to get up to speed, so the dying probably intensified as more time passed.
Mexican Revolution (1910-20): 1 000 000 [make link]
The population explosion of the 20th Century is so pervasive that populations have continued to climb during most of the bad times listed on this page; however, the intensity of the Mexican Revolution is such that the counted population of Mexico actually declined from 15,160,369 in 1910 to 14,334,780 in 1921. How many people, therefore, died in the war?
Most scholars are rather vague:
"conservatively estimated at half a million" (Peter Calvert, Mexico, 1973)
"perhaps a million" (C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: the constitutionalist years, 1972)
"estimated at 1 million" (Crow, The Epic of Latin America)
Encyclopedia Americana (2003), "Mexico": 1M lives
"at least a million" (Wallechensky)
"perhaps 2 million" (R.J. Rummel, although he later tightens his estimate to 2,142,000)
"as many as two million" (T.R. Fehrenbach, Fire and Blood, 1973)
War Deaths:
Wallechensky: 200,000
Small & Singer: 250,000
Rummel: 200,000 battle deaths + 125,000 incidental civilian deaths
Enrique Krauze, Mexico : Biography of Power (1997): 250,000 combat deaths; 750,000 of disease/hunger
Eckhardt: 125,000 civ. + 125,000 mil. = 250,000
A detailed online analysis can be found at [http://www.hist.umn.edu/~rmccaa/missmill/mxrev.htm] "Missing millions: the human cost of the Mexican Revolution" by Robert McCaa. He estimates 1.4M excess deaths due to war. In contrast, he mentions these previous estimates:
Ordorica and Lezama: 1.4M
Collver: 0.5M - 2.1M
Loyo: 0.9M
Greer: 0.6M
Gamio: 0.55M
Gonzalez Navarro: 0.3M
Mier y Teran: 0.2M
AVERAGE: Of the 17 estimates here, the MEDIAN is 1,000,000, and the MEAN is 927,000.
American involvement: This is the only war (well okay, there were a few balloons in WW2) of the 20th Century to directly impact the United States mainland.
According to a report from the US Congress dated 17 Feb. 1915, the Mexican Revolution killed 213 US citizens in Mexico, as well as 36 US citizens inside the US -- often from stray bullets in border towns. Also, 92 Mexicans were killed inside the US because of the Revolution (That's the official total. Unofficially, it may be as high as 400 (Ronald Atkin, Revolution! Mexico 1910-20, 1969))
Keep in mind that this report predates Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, NM, where 18 Americans and possibly 50-100 Mexicans were killed. Additionally, 19 US Marines died seizing Veracruz, and 30 US soldiers died on Pershing's expedition. (Wallechinsky)
Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace
Columbus NM raid: 8 US civ. + 10 US soldiers k. 100 Villistas k. + "some" hanged after trial.
Punitive Expedition: 135 Villistas k.
Texasranger.org [http://www.texasranger.org/history/SilverStars1.htm]
"Mexican raids into Texas in 1915-16 caused an estimated 21 American deaths; an estimated 300 Mexicans or Tejanos may have been killed in South Texas by the actions of Rangers, vigilantes and citizens. Some sources place the death toll as high as 300 and 3,000."
Armenian Massacres (1915-23): 1 500 000 [make link]
The big massacres occured in 1915, but there were rumblings before and after:
1909:
Rummel: 30,000
Eckhardt: 6,000
1915-18:
Britannica: 600,000
Dict.Wars: 600,000 died of starvation, disease and exhaustion
Steven Katz in Is the Holocaust Unique? (Rosenbaum, ed.): 475,800-775,800
Encarta: 800,000
Kuper: 800,000
Martin Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Century: 1,000,000
Eckhardt: 1,000,000 civ.
Robert Melson in Is the Holocaust Unique?: 1,000,000
Christopher Walker, Armenia : The Survival of a Nation (1980): 1,000,000 (in Turkey, 1915-16), plus an additional 50-100,000 (invasion of the Caucasus, 1918)
Alan Palmer, The Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire (1992)
Official Turkish est.: 300,000
max. Armenian claims: 2M
probable: >1,300,000 during war and aftermath
Porter: 1,000,000 to 1,500,000
Rummel: 1,404,000 domestic, 83,000 foreign
War Annual 8 (1997): 1,500,000
The Turkish Government denies that the Armenians were massacred, and instead, accuses the Armenians of massacring some 23,100 Turks. [http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/default_en.asp?belgeno=3338]
MEDIAN of these 16 estimates is 1M
Individual massacres
Trebizond
Bitlis
1919-23:
C. Walker: 250,000 (in Turkey, 1919-22)
Robert Melson in Is the Holocaust Unique?: 500,000
Rummel: 440,000 domestic, 175,000 foreign
China, Warlord Era (1917-28): 800 000
Rummel:
Battle Deaths: 178,000
Democides:
By Warlords: 450,000
By Guomindang: 139,000
By Communists: 43,000
SUBTOTAL (Military + Civilian): 810,000
Famine (non-democidal): 6,000,000
Gilbert
Revolt in Kansu (1928): 200,000 Muslims k.
Battle of Hsuchow, Guomindang v. Northern Army (1927): 50,000 k.
Eckhardt:
Yunan Revolt (1917-18): 1,000
Szechuanese Wars (1917-18, 1920): 6,000
Civil War (1926-28): 10,000
Muslim Revolt (1928): 200,000
TOTAL: 217,000
China, Nationalist Era (1928-37): 3 100 000
Rummel:
Battle Deaths: 406,000
Democides:
By Guomindang (KMT): 1,524,000
By Communists: 850,000
By Warlords: 350,000
SUBTOTAL (Military + Civilian): 3,130,000
Famine/Flood: 6,500,000
Rummel estimates that Chiang Kai-Shek committed a total of 10,214,000 democides from 1921 to 1948. This number would include the democides counted here, as well as those during the Second World War and Chinese Civil War.
S&S:
Warlords vs Govt (1929-30): 75,000
Communists vs Govt (1930-35): 200,000
TOTAL: 275,000
Eckhardt (mil.+civ.):
Warlords vs Govt (1929-30): 75,000
Communists vs Govt (1930-35): 500,000
TOTAL: 575,000
Gilbert, citing Ho Ping-ti: 1,000,000 deaths in Szechwan from war, 1932-34
Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 1938:
KMT admits 1,000,000 killed or starved in 5th Campaign, recovering Kiansi Soviet.
Population of Soviets decreased by 600,000.
3-Year famine in NW killed 3 (official ) to 6 million.
Shanghai Massacre: 5,000 k. by KMT.
Acc2 to Li Chiang-lin, Apr.-Jun 1927, Ho Chien executed 20,000 in Liu-yang District, 15,000 in Liling District
Wallechinsky:
Battle Deaths: 1,275,000
Civilian Deaths: 1,000,000 in 1933-34 alone.
Korean War (1950-53): 2 800 000 [make link]
Deaths:
I don't understand why all the sources I check are so sure of their numbers when they all give different numbers. Okay, some of the discrepancies come from disagreement over what to include -- do we count only the 33,741 Americans killed in battle, or do we add the 2,827 non-combat deaths as well? But some of the other disagreements are harder to reconcile:
South Korea:
SoKo Military
47,000 KIA (Encyclopedia Americana)
46,812 KIA + 66,436 MIA (Wallechinsky; also Clodfelter, citing Defense Dept.) [=113,248]
59,000 (Summers)
70,000 (Clodfelter's own est.)
100,000 (Leckie)
113,248 (COWP)
212,500 KIA (Pentagon: � "KWM")
225,784 (Nahm93)
281,000 (Rummel)
281,257 to 400,000 (Lewy - the latter citing the ROK Defense Ministry)
415,000 (S&S; Hastings)
[MEDIAN: 113,248]
SoKo Civilian
315,000 (Rummel)
244,000 killed and 303,000 missing. (Nahm88)
373,500 killed and 387,740 missing (Nahm93)
[MEDIAN: 547,000]
SoKo Military + Civilian
415,004 killed (Leckie; Wallechinsky; Clodfelter, citing Defense Dept. incl. k, exec., dis.)
591,285 (Compton's)
596,000 (Rummel)
600,000 (Dictionary of 20C World History)
987,024 (Nahm93)
1,300,000 (Britannica)
[MEDIAN: 595,000]
North Korea:
NoKo Military
130,000 KIA (Pentagon: � "KWM")
294,151 (Nahm93)
214,899 KIA + 101,680 MIA (Wallechinsky; Clodfelter, citing ["highly suspect"] Defense Dept. est.) [=316,579]
316,579 (COWP)
350,000 (Rummel)
520,000 (Small & Singer, FAS)
[MEDIAN: 316,579]
NoKo Civilian
406,000 killed + 680,000 missing (Nahm93)
Up to 1,000,000 (Wallechinsky; Clodfelter)
1,185,000 (Rummel)
[MEDIAN: 1,000,000]
NoKo Military + Civilian
500,000 (Britannica)
700,000 (Dictionary of 20C World History)
926,000 (Compton's)
1,316,579 (Wallechinsky; Clodfelter)
1,380,151 (Nahm93)
1,535,000 (Rummel)
[MEDIAN: 1,316,579]
China
110,000 KIA + 35,000 other (FAS citing "Chinese sources")
225,000 KIA (Pentagon: � "KWM")
401,401 KIA + 21,211 MIA (Wallechinsky; Clodfelter, citing ["highly suspect"] Defense Dept. est.) [= 422,612]
422,612 (COWP)
500,000 (Rummel)
900,000 (Compton's, S&S, FAS)
1,000,000 (Britannica)
[MEDIAN: ca. 460,000]
Combined Chinese and North Korean military dead
400,000 (from disease, Wallechinsky; Clodfelter [in addition to KIA est. above])
500,000 (from battle, Summers)
0.5M (generally, Lewy)
1.5M (from all causes, Hastings)
US
33,000 (Dictionary of 20C World History)
33,625 (Nahm93)
33,741 battle + 2,827 other = 36,568 (DIOR [official])
36,940, incl. 3275 non-combat (FAS)
54,000 (Britannica, S&S)
54,246 (COWP)
33,629 KIA + 20,617 other = 54,246 (Summers, Wallechinsky, Lewy, Encyclopedia Americana)
33,629 (Compton's; Hastings)
Other UN: 2,186 (Nahm93); 2,630 (S&S); 3,063 (Hastings, Summers); 3,194 (Wallechinsky)
By nation
UK
11 Nov. 2000 Times [London]: 1,078 British
Clodfelter, COWP, Wallechinsky: 710
Leckie, S&S: 670
Turkey
S&S: 720
COWP, Clodfelter, Leckie, Wallechinsky: 717
Canada
Clodfelter: 291
COWP, Leckie: 309
S&S: 310
France
COWP, Clodfelter, Leckie: 288
S&S: 290
Australia
Leckie: 265.
COWP, S&S: 281
Clodfelter: 291
AWM: 339 Australia
Greece
S&S: 170
COWP, Clodfelter, Leckie: 169
Columbia
Clodfelter, S&S, Leckie: 140
Ethiopia
Clodfelter, S&S: 120
Neth.
S&S: 110
COWP, Clodfelter, Leckie: 111
Thailand
S&S: 110
Clodfelter, Leckie: 114
Belgium
S&S: 100
COWP, Clodfelter: 97
Phillipines
S&S: 90
Clodfelter, Leckie: 92
TOTAL
1,333,060 killed + 1,067,740 missing (Nahm93, not including Chinese)
1,892,000 (S&S, not including civilians)
2,454,000 (Compton's)
2,488,744 (Wallechinsky)
2,854,000 (Britannica)
2,889,000 (Eckhardt)
3,000,000 (D. Smith)
3,000,000 (B&J)
3,062,000 (Rummel)
3,500,000 (Lewy, incl. 2-3M civilians)
[MEDIAN of TOTALS: ca. 2,950,000] or [TOTAL of MEDIANS: ca. 2,470,000]
Atrocities:
1950 massacre in Seoul by North Koreans: 128,936 (Nahm93); 100,000 (Dictionary of 20C World History) [AP makes it sound like these were all over So.Ko., not just Seoul.]
AP [http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2000/investigative-reporting/works/]
No Gun Ri, 1950: US massacre of civilian refugees (ca. 100 killed by air attack, 200-400 killed by infantry) first reported by AP, 29 Sep. 1999. US News & World Report (22 May 2000) cast serious doubt on the reliability of many of the eye-witness accounts. The AP response (16 May 2000) restored credibility.
Killed by N.Koreans (13 Oct. 1999 AP):
Taejon: 5,000 to 7,500 civilians and 42 US POWs
"The U.S. Army, in November 1951, cited U.N. figures saying 25,575 South Korean civilians were killed during the communist occupation of South Korea. But the South Korean government later put that toll at 129,000."
Gilbert, History of the Twentieth Century: 26,000 South Korean civilians executed by North Koreans within their zone of conquest, 1950.
Lewy: 2,701 out of 7,140 US POWs died after capture. In all, 5,639 USAns died as a result of war crimes.
VFW, citing Potter Comm. Report: 7,000 civilians and 60 US POWs k. in Taejon by N.Kor. (23-27 Sept. 1950) [http://www.vfw.org/magazine/feb03/koreanwaratrocities.htm]
Alleged & unproven USA/ROK atrocities:
From the 14 July 2003 Guardian: "[The North Koreans] say that the US started the fighting and committed atrocities on civilians at Sinchon, a claim for which there is little evidence, but one which is the subject of numerous gory paintings."
13 Oct. 1999 AP: "The North Koreans... alleged that earlier the southern government had murdered thousands of communist sympathizers around Taejon... in July 1950."
Some guys on Internet: Comm. sympathizers killed by S.Koreans (1950) [http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/nogun2.htm]
Pusan: 50,000
Throughout the country: 100,000+
Seoul: 29,000
Some other guy on Internet: 35,000 k.at Sinchun [http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/sinchun.htm]
North Korean news releases:
[http://210.145.168.243/pk/118th_issue/99110404.htm]
"At least 109,000 people of south Korea were killed by the U.S. imperialists in 1949 alone."
"In Sinchon county, South Hwanghae Province, alone they killed more than 35,380 people or one fourth of its entire population in a little over 50 days."
"Lording it over south Korea after the war, they ruthlessly killed people as their hunting and shooting targets and playthings and for pleasure, regardless of men and women, young and old."
NOTE: The Korean War was preceded by an unsuccessful Communist uprising. It was the failure to seize control from within that sparked the North Korean invasion.
Sources:
Blair, Clay, The Forgotten War (1987)
Clodfelter, Michael, Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991
COWP: Correlates of War Project [http://www.correlatesofwar.org/cow2%20data/WarData/InterState/Inter-State%20War%20Participants%20(V%203-0).htm]
DIOR: US Dept. of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports [http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/CASUALTY/KOREA.xls] (NOTE: These numbers do not include 17,678 other deaths which occured outside the theater of ops.)
Encyclopedia Americana (1995)
Hastings, Max, The Korean War (1987)
Leckie, Robert, Conflict: the history of the Korean War, 1950-53 (1962)
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam (1978)
Nahm, Andrew, Korea: tradition and transformation (1988): "Nahm88"
Nahm, Andrew, Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea (1993): "Nahm93"
"Pentagon"
Blair, Leckie and the Encyclopedia Americana cite Pentagon estimates for the total killed, wounded and missing:
All UN: 996,937 (Pentagon, kwm)
South Korea: 850,000 (Pentagon, kwm)
All Communist: 1,420,000 (Pentagon, kwm.)
China: 900,000 (Pentagon, kwm)
North Korea: 520,000 (Pentagon, kwm)
Now, if we use the standard ratio of 1 killed for every 3 wounded, we get the numbers that I have attributed above to "Pentagon"
While we're at it, notice that S&S's estimates for killed are often the same as the Pentagon's estimates for killed, wounded and missing.
Summers, H., Korean War Almanac (1990)
North Korea (1948 et seq.) [make link]
Communist regime:
Rummel estimates that the Communist regime of North Korea committed 1,663,000 democides between 1948 and 1987
North Korean victims: 1,293,000
South Korean victims: 363,000
Courtois, Stephane, Le Livre Noir du Communism: 2,000,000
In Party purges: 100,000
In concentration camps: 1.5M
23 June 2003 US News & WR: 400,000 died in gulags in past 3 decades.
The Center for the Advancement of North Korean Human Rights estimates that some 400,000 prisoners have died in labor camps since 1972. [http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/oldnkhuman/eng/nk/nknews12_01.html]
Famine, 1995-98
13 March 1999, Agence France Presse: (citing N. Korean defector) 3,500,000 deaths as of 12/98
19 Oct. 2000 Guardian: 3M
MSF: 3.5M [http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/other/deadly_2001.shtml]
19 Oct. 2003 NY Times: 2M died in preventable famine.
10 May 1999, AP:
The North Korean govt. estimates 220,000 famine-related deaths, 1995-98
US Congressional delegation: 2M
South Korean intelligence estimates that the population of North Korea fell from 25M to 22M.
Rwanda and Burundi (1959-95): 1 350 000 [make link]
Back and forth massacres between Hutu and Tutsi
Rwanda (late 1950s, early 1960s, primarily Tutsi killed by Hutu)
Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa: 10,000 (1959-61)
Edgerton
1959: 20,000 Tutsi k. by Hutu. "Tutsi soon struck back, killing at least as many Hutu"
1963: 10,000 Tutsi k.
Harff & Gurr: 5,000 - 14,000 (1963-64)
Eckhardt: 102,000 civ. + 3,000 mil. = 105,000 (1956-65)
D.Smith: 20,000 (1959-61) + 100,000 (1962-66) = 120,000
WHPSI: 21,000 (1964), 5,000 (1966), none listed for 1962, '63, '65, but it might be that the 1964 number is meant to cover the entire span rather than just '64.
S&S: 2,500 (1963-64)
Burundi (1969, primarily Hutu killed by Tutsi)
D.Smith: > 50,000
Burundi (1972-73, primarily Hutu killed by Tutsi) 120 000
Dunnigan (1991): 210,000
1984 World Almanac: 150,000 Hutu, 10,000 Tutsi
Edgerton: 100,000-200,000
BBC: 150,000 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1068991.stm]
Diamond, Jared, The Third Chimpanzee: 80-200,000
Rene Lemarchand: 100,000 - 150,000 (in Century of Genocide, Samuel Totten, ed., (1997))
Britannica: 100,000 - 150,000
MEDIAN: ca. 125,000
Dict.Wars: 100,000 Hutu and 10,000 Tutsi
D.Smith: 100,000
Eckhardt: 80,000 civ. + 20,000 mil. = 100,000
Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa: 100,000
WHPSI: 81,754 (1971-72)
S&S: 50,000 battle deaths
Burundi (1988) 20 000
Dunnigan (1991): 33,000
Britannica: 20,000
D.Smith: > 20,000
War Annual 8 (1997): 20,000
Encarta: 5,000
MEDIAN: 20,000
Burundi (1993- ) 200 000
[Listed Chronologically]
Dict.Wars: 50,000 in 1993
B&J: 100,000 (1992-93)
CDI: 170,000 (1988-97)
29 April 1999 AP: 150,000-250,000 (1993-98)
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 200,000 (1993-99)
Ploughshares 2000: 200,000 (1988-2000)
BBC
Country Profiles: 300,000 since 1993 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068873.stm]
22 April, 2005: 250,000 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4472135.stm]
15 July 2003 MSN/Reuters: >300,000, mostly civilians, since 1993
Rwanda (1994, primarily Tutsi killed by Hutu) 937 000
D.Smith: 500,000
War Annual 8 (1997): 500,000
Rene Lemarchand: 500,000 (in Century of Genocide, Samuel Totten, ed., (1997))
Agence France Presse (20 Feb. 1998): 500,000 to 800,000
Ploughshares 2000: 500,000-1,000,000 (1994) followed by tens of thous.
PBS Frontline: the Triumph of Evil: 800,000 ( http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html)
MEDIAN: ca. 800,000
Victoria Brittain, Death of Dignity (1998): 850,000
Dict.Wars: 850,000 in 1994
4 Apr 2004 Reuters: 937,000 according to new census by Rwandan govt.
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 800,000 in 1994; 1M total as of 1999
B&J: 1,000,000 (1990-95)
Nyarubuye Massacre
4 Apr 2004 BBC: 5,000-10,000 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3582267.stm]
TOTAL OF MEDIANS: 1.2 M
TOTAL RANGE: 0.7-1.7 M
Second Indochina War (1960-75): 3 500 000 [make link]
Vietnam War (1965-73): 1 700 000
Most historians of the Second Indochina War concern themselves primarily with the American Phase of the conflict, 1965-73; however, many do not specify whether their estimated death tolls cover only this phase of the war or the whole thing. An asterisk(*) indicates that the number seems to cover the entire conflict rather than just the American Phase, but check the "Sources" section to see exactly which years are covered by each authority:
South Vietnam military
181,483 (Gilbert)
185,000 to 225,000 (Britannica)
220,357 (Lewy, Ency. Americana)
223,748 (Summers; also 3 April 1995 AP)
224,000 (Kutler, Olson)
250,000 (Clodfelter, Grenville*)
254,257 (Wallechinsky*, COWP [1965-75])
650,000 (Small & Singer)
[MEDIAN: 224,000]
North Vietnamese military and Viet Cong
444,000 (Ency. Americana)
500,000 (S&S)
660,000 (Olson)
666,000 (Lewy, with the possibility that as many as 222,000 (1/3) of these were actually SVN civilians mistaken for VC)
666,000 (Summers)
700,000 (COWP [DRV 1965-75])
700,000-1,000,000 (Wallechinsky*)
900,000 (Britannica; Grenville*)
922,290 (Gilbert [NVN soldiers + civilians + VC])
1,000,000 (Clodfelter)
1,100,000 (Tucker*, Official VN* [1954-75])
[MEDIAN: starred*: 1,000,000. unstarred: 666,000]
South Vietnamese civilians
50,000 (Gilbert)
250,000 (Olson)
287,000 (Clodfelter = 247,600 war deaths + 38,954 assassinated by NLF)
300,000 (Kutler; Summers)
340,000 (Lewy's estimate, with the possibility that an additional 222,000 counted as VC (above) belong in this category)
430,000 (The Sen. E. Kennedy Commission, according to Lewy, Olson)
522,000 (Wallechinsky*)
1,000,000 (Britannica [in both North and South]; Eckhardt; Grenville*)
2,000,000 (Tucker*, Official VN* [N&S, 1954-75],)
[MEDIAN: starred*: ca. 1,500,000. unstarred: 300,000]
North Vietnamese civilians: 65,000 (Kutler, Lewy, Olson, Summers, Wallechinsky) by American bombing.
USA
55,337 (Gilbert)
47,378 KIA + 10,799 other = 58,177 (Official US DoD, 1964-73)
58,159 (Kutler)
58,153 (Wallechinsky*, COWP)
58,000 (Britannica)
47,244 KIA + 10,446 other = 57,690 (Olson; Summers, 1961-80)
57,605 (Ency. Americana)
56,146 (Lewy: 46,498 KIA + 10,388 other + 719 MIA)
56,000 (S&S)
South Korea: 4,407 (Lewy, Olson, Summers); 4,687 (Wallechinsky, COWP); 5,000 (S&S)
Philippines: 1,000 (S&S)
Thailand: 351 (Lewy, Olson, Summers, Wallechinsky); 1,000 (S&S)
Australia: 469 (Lewy, Summers, Olson [w/NZ]); 492 (S&S); 494 (Wallechinsky); 520 (AWM)
TOTAL
1,021,442 (COWP)
1,216,000 (military only, S&S)
1,312,000 (Summers)
1,353,000 (Lewy)
1,520,453 (WHPSI: S. Vietnamese only, 1965-75)
1,637,000 (Olson)
1,721,000 (Kutler)
1,749,000 (Wallechinsky*)
1,800,000 (B&J*, 1960-75)
2,058,000 (Eckhardt)
2,163,000 (Britannica)
2,500,000 (Grenville*)
3,000,000 (1965-75, Chomsky* (1987))
>3,100,000 (Tucker*; Official VN*)
MEDIAN TOTALS
Whole conflict*: [MEDIAN of TOTALS: ca. 2,750,000] or [TOTAL of MEDIANS: ca. 2,850,000]
American Phase (unstarred): [MEDIAN of TOTALS: ca. 1,700,000] or [TOTAL of MEDIANS: ca. 1,300,000]
Misc. Atrocities:
Lewy:
36,725 civilians assassinated by VC/NVA, 1957-72
2,800 civilians executed and 3,000 missing after Hue was captured by VC/NVA, 1968
400 civilians massacred by USAns in the area of Son My village, incl. 175-200 in My Lai hamlet, 1968
Because of the lack of weapons recovered from many bodies, Lewy considers the possibility that up to 222,000 VC KIA may have actually been innocent bystanders. (Or maybe not. Poor evidence either way.)
Harff & Gurr: 475,000 civilians in NLF areas were victims of repressive politicide, 1965-72
Young: Hue massacre, 1968:
Officially: 2,800-5,700
Len Ackland: 300-400
Chomsky (1987): 21,000 VC civilian officials assassinated under US/GVN Phoenix project (-in text. Endnote gives estimates ranging 40-48,000.). Lewy considers these to be (mostly) legitimate military targets.
October 22, 2003 Toledo Blade: Tiger Force (US) committed ongoing atrocities in Quang Nam province, July-Nov 1967. Incomplete records show 81 murders. The unit reported 1000+ enemies killed, but it sounds like a lot of those weren't legit. From the article details, I'd guess they murdered a few hundred (300�) civilians. [http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20031022/SRTIGERFORCE/110190169]
Hanson:
VN civilians k. by indiscriminate American bombing: 50,000
VN civilians k. by indiscriminate Communist rocketing, artillery and terrorism: 400,000
Rummel:
51,000 democides by South Vietnam (1963-75), incl...
executions: 30,000
forced relocations: 5,000 dead
prison deaths: 5,000
166,000 democides by NVN/VC in SVN:
Officials assassinated: 17,000
Civilians assassinated: 49,000
Refugees killed, 1975: 50,000
Misc: 50,000
6,000 democides by USA
In addition to the American Phase of the War, there are four tangental conflicts which are sometimes discussed as part of the Vietnam War, but usually considered peripheral:
Vietnamese Civil War, internal phase, 1960-65
Clodfelter, 1961-64
South Vietnam, military: 21,442
Communist: 71,000
Civilian: 160,000
TOTAL: 252,442
Chomsky (1987):
1957-61: 66,000 VC (p.274, citing B. Fall), 80,000 Vietnamese (p.323)
1961-4/65: 89,000 VC
to mid 1966: 60,000 ("enemy" (McNamara) - "probably" including civilians (Chomsky))
Total, 1954-65: 160-170,000 VNese (p.324)
S&S: 300,000 battle deaths, 1960-65
Eckhardt: 200,000 civ. + 100,000 mil. = 300,000 (1960-65)
COWP: 302,000
RVN: 300,000
USA: 2,000
Young: NLF lost 100,000 dead 1961-(?)64
WHPSI:
21,686 deaths by political violence in South Vietnam, 1960-64
4,021 from 1955 to 1959
Cambodian Civil War (1970-75): 600 000
Chomsky (1987): half a million to a million.
Rummel, 1954-75:
War Dead: 429,000
Democide: 288,000
TOTAL: 717,000
Tucker: 10% of 7M [which comes to 700,000]
Clodfelter; also Wallechinsky (1970-75)
Cambodian govt.: 50,000
Total violent deaths, incl. Comm. and civ.: >250,000
Total war-related deaths, incl. hunger: 600,000
T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule (1996), citing a Finnish commission: 600,000
MEDIAN: ca. 0.5-0.6M
Chirot: 500,000
B&J: 300,000
SIPRI 1989: 156,000
S&S, 1970-73
Cambodia: 150,000
USA: 500
SVietnam: 5,000
NVietnam: 500
TOTAL: 156,000
Eckhardt: 156,000
COWP
Cambodia: 50,000
USA: 500
SVietnam: 5,000
NVietnam: 500
TOTAL: 185,000
WHPSI: 55,750 k. by pol.viol., 1970-75
Laos
Wallechinsky, 1959-75: 250,000
Martin Stuart-Fox A History of Laos: 200,000 by 1973, incl. 30,000 Hmong.
Rummel, 1954-75:
War Dead: 32,000
Democide: 38,000
TOTAL: 70,000
Eckhardt: 12,000 civ. + 12,000 mil. = 24,000 (1960-73)
S&S, 1960-73
Laos: 5,000 (1960-62), 15,000 (1963-73)
USA: 500
NVietnam: 3,000
TOTAL: 23,500
WHPSI: 22,355 k. by pol.viol., 1963-72
T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule (1996): 20,000 Meo irregulars and 15,000 Royal Lao Army
Harff & Gurr: 18-20,000 Meo tribemen were victims of genocide, 1963-65
Vietnamese Civil War, final phase, 1973-75
Young, citing Pentagon estimates:
ARVN: 26,500 (1973) + 30,000 (1974)
PRG/DRV: 39,000 (1973) + 61,000 (1974)
Civilians: 15,000
[TOTAL: 171,500 killed in the "Cease-Fire War".]
[My guess is 2.8M for the entire Vietnam conflict, plus .6M for Cambodia, plus .1M in Laos
Sources:
Britannica: not specified, but the implication is that the statistics cover the entire war.
Clodfelter, Michael, Vietnam in Military Statistics (1995)
COWP: Correlates of War Project. Covers the years 1965-75 [http://www.correlatesofwar.org/cow2%20data/WarData/InterState/Inter-State%20War%20Participants%20(V%203-0).htm]
Eckhardt: covers the years 1965-75 (unless otherwise noted)
Encyclopedia Americana (2003), "Vietnam War"
Grenville: does not specify which years are covered, but by context, it seems to be 1960-75
Hanson, Victor Davis, "Tet, January 31-April 6, 1968," Carnage and culture (2001)
Kutler, Stanley: Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1996)
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam (1978): Lewy's estimates cover the years 1965-74. (u.o.n.)
Official VN: On the 20th Anniversary of the war's end, Hanoi announced its official tally of losses for 21 years of war: 1954-75 [3 April 1995 AP; 30 April 1995 Washington Post. Herald Sun, April 5, 1995; Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), January 1, 1996; Financial Times (London,England), April 5, 1995; Xinhua News Agency, APRIL 3, 1995; United Press International, February 25, 1997. (5 Nov. 2004) See also, Common Mistake #2]
Olson, James: Dictionary of the Vietnam War (1988): covers the years 1965-74 (u.o.n.)
Summers, Harry: Vietnam War Almanac (1985)
Tucker, Spencer, Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1998)
Wallechinsky: death tolls apparently cover the years 1957-75. (u.o.n.)
Young, Marilyn, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (1991)
Ethiopia (1962-92): 1 400 000 [make link]
Essentially, this conflict consists of two simultaneous civil wars in the same country:
WHPSI gives 34,825 deaths as of 1977; which is bad, but still on the low end of bad.
Chicago Tribune (10 Nov. 1985):
Ogaden War: 25-30,000
Eritrean War: 20,000
SIPRI 1989 estimated
Ogaden War (1964-88): 40,000
Eritrean War (1962-88):
45,000 military
50,000 civilian
B&J
1st Ogaden War (1964): 700
2nd Ogaden War (1972-78): 30,000
3rd Ogaden War (1987-88): 300
Eritrean War (1965-93): 200,000
TOTAL: 231,000
Dict.Wars: 250,000 deaths in the Eritrean war, aggravated by drought and famine.
Eckhardt
Ogaden, w/ Cuban & Somali intervention (1972-80): 15,000 civ. + 21,000 mil. = 36,000
Eritrean revolt & famine (1974-87): 500,000 civ. + 46,000 mil. = 546,000
D.Smith says that 1,500,000 had died as of 1991.
When the war ended, the Washington Post (26 May 91) was saying that the war had killed 400,000 people. (plus 1,000,000 dead by famine which you may or may not want to add into the final total.)
12 Dec. 1994 Dallas Morning News: 1,500,000 people died from war, drought and forced resettlement
Atrocities under Mengistu (r. 1974-91):
14 Dec. 1994 NY Times:
Killed in campaign of persecution after 1974: 150,000
Died in forced relocation programs: 100,000
Died in ensuing famines: 1,000,000
27 Jan. 2000 Washington Post: as many as 1M deaths attributed to his govt.
Agence France Presse (8 Oct. 1996): estimates of the number of killings range from 50,000 to 200,000.
Harff & Gurr: 30,000 political opponents were victims of revolutionary politicide, 1974-79
Nigeria (1966-70): 1 000 000 [make link]
Coup, 1966
Harff & Gurr: 9-30,000 Ibos living in the north killed, 1966
Edgerton: 5,000 to 50,000 Ibos
Biafran War, 1967-70:
John de St. Jorre, The Brothers' War (1972): 600,000
WPA3: 600,000
Edgerton: 500,000 to 1,000,000
Kuper: 600,000 to 1,000,000
Encarta: at least 1,000,000 died of starvation
B&J: 1,000,000 total
S&S: 1,000,000 battle deaths
Our Times: at least 1,000,000
Robert Melson: over 1,000,000 starved (in Is the Holocaust Unique?)
Compton's Encyclopedia: 1,500,000 starved
WHPSI: 1,993,900 deaths by political violence, 1966-70.
Dict.Wars: nearly 2,000,000
Eckhardt: 1,000,000 civ. + 1,000,000 mil. = 2,000,000
D. Smith: 2,000,000
Don Jacobs, The Brutality of Nations (1987): 3,000,000
MEDIAN: 1.0 M+
Bangladesh (1971): 1 250 000 [make link]
The high estimates of how many Bengalis were massacred are almost 10 times the low estimates:
WHPSI: 307,013 deaths by pol.viol. in Pakistan, 1971.
D.Smith says 500,000
S&S: 500,000 (Civil War, Mar.-Dec. 1971)
1984 World Almanac: up to 1,000,000 civilians were killed.
Hartman: 1,000,000 Bengalis
B&J: 1,000,000 Bengalis
Kuper cites a study by Chaudhuri which counted 1,247,000 dead, and mentions the possibility that it may be as many as 3,000,000.
MEDIAN: 1,000,000-1,250,000
Porter: 1M-2M
Rummel: 1,500,000.
Eckhardt: 1,000,000 civ. + 500,000 mil. = 1,500,000 (Bangladesh)
Harff & Gurr: 1,250,000 to 3,000,000
The official estimate in Bangladesh is 3 million dead. [AP 30 Dec. 2000; Agence France Presse 3 Oct. 2000;
Rounaq Johan: 3,000,000 (in Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, Samuel Totten, ed., (1997))
Compton's Encyclopedia, "Genocide": 3,000,000
Encyclopedia Americana (2003), "Bangladesh": 3,000,000
Indo-Pak War, 1971
B&J
W. Pakistan: 8,000
India: 2-3,000
S&S
India: 8,000 [sic]
Pakistan: 3,000 [sic]
TOTAL: 11,000
Eckhardt (Indo-Paki War): 11,000
Clodfelter
India: 3,241
Pakistan: 7,982
[TOTAL: 11,223]
WPA3
India: 3,037
Pakistan: 7,982
TOTAL: 11,019
Hartman:
India: 10,633
Pakistan: 17,000
[TOTAL: 27,633]
Cambodia, Khmer Rouge (1975-1978): 1 650 000 [make link]
Pol Pot's reign of terror is probably the second most widely publicized genocide of the century, so it's pretty easy to find estimates:
Math Ly, member of Cambodian Politburo: 3,300,000 (21 May 1987 AP)
Rummel: 2,000,000 domestic + 35,000 foreign democides
SIPRI 1989: 2,000,000
Elizabeth Becker When the War Was Over (1986): as many as 2,000,000
D. Smith: 1 to 3 million
Eckhardt: 1,500,000 civ. + 500,000 mil. = 2,000,000
War Annual 6: 2,000,000
Kutler, Stanley: Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1996): 2M
Courtois, Stephane, Le Livre Noir du Communism: 1,300,000 to 2,300,000
Clodfelter, Michael, Vietnam in Military Statistics (1995): 1,200,000 to 2,000,000
Wallechinsky: between 1 and 2 million.
Dict.Wars: 1M ("Cambodian Civil War of 1970-75") to 2M ("Kampuchean Civil War of 1978-98")
P. Johnson: 1,200,000.
Marie Martin, Cambodia, a Shattered Society (1994) cites:
US State Dept.: 1.2-1.8M
Demographer En Meng Try: 1.0-1.2M
Encarta: "...may have caused more than 1 million..."
Chandler, David, Brother Number One (1992): "conservative estimate" of 800,000 to 1,000,000.
Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (1991): in the text she gives the range of estimates as 0.7 to 2.0 M. In a footnote, she favorably cites Michael Vickery's estimate of 700,000 to 1,000,000.
Chomsky (1987): 750,000, citing Vickery.
These are the numbers quoted in Pol Pot's 1998 obituaries:
"more than 1 million" (New York Times, Newsweek, Time)
"1.5 million or more" (Washington Post)
"up to 2 million" (U.S. News and World Reports)
Ben Kiernan in The Pol Pot Regime (also in "The Cambodian Genocide", Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, Samuel Totten, editor, 1997) estimates 1,671,000 (21%) killed out of a population of 7,890,000, including...
Vietnamese: 10,000 (100%)
Chinese: 215,000 (50%)
Lao: 4,000 (40%)
Thai: 8,000 (40%)
Cham: 90,000 (36%)
Urban Khmer: 500,000 (25%)
Rural Khmer: 825,000 (16%)
Average: If we take these 25 estimates and figure that "more than" means 20% more, while "up to" means 20% less, and "between" means dead center, then both the median and mean of all these estimates is 1.6M
Mozambique (1975-1992): 1 000 000 [make link]
Govt vs RENAMO
The War Annual 4 (1990) estimates 100,000 killed and 300,000 starved, 1979-89.
SIPRI 1990: 7-9,000 military + 100,000 civilian (1985-89)
Washington Post estimates:
100,000 deaths (5 Oct 1988)
600,000-1,000,000 dead (26 Nov 1990)
600,000 dead by the end of the fighting (17 Dec 1992)
an additional 100,000 after the fighting resumed in 1992 (28 Nov 1993)
Encarta estimates the dead at 900,000 by 1990.
Dan Smith (1997) estimates an even million.
BBC: 1,000,000 (1977-92) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1063120.stm]
Edgerton: 1,000,000+
B&J: 1,000,000 (1976-92)
Atrocities, civilians murdered by RENAMO
20 May 1988 Facts on File World News Digest (citing US State Dept.): 100,000 k. in previous 2 years. [1986-mid-1988]
1988 Gersony Report (US State Dept.): 100,000
Young: 100-200,000 [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/YLS.htm]
Dictionary of 20C World History: 1M
Afghanistan (1979-2001): 1 800 000 [make link]
Soviets vs. Mujahideen vs. Govt. vs. Taliban [estimates listed chronologically]
War Annual 6 (1994): 1,000,000
Britannica Annual (1994): 1,500,000
Wallechinsky (1995): 1,300,000
D.Smith (1995): 1,500,000
B&J (1997): 1,500,000 (1979-95)
Dictionary of 20C World History (1997): 1M
CDI: 1,550,000 (1978-97)
29 April 1999 AP: 2,000,000
Dict.Wars: >2M
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 1,800,000
Ploughshares 2000: 1,500,000
[MEDIAN of latest five: 1,800,000]
Partials
Soviet Phase and immediate aftermath only
Isby, War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan (1989): Civilian deaths:
1986 voluntary aid study: 600,000
1987 USAID study: 875,000
1987 Gallup study: 1,200,000
2 June 2002 LA Times: 670,000 civilians during 10-year Soviet occupation
Toronto Star (6 May 1991): more than 1,000,000
SIPRI 1990: 1,000,000 total dead (the 1988 Yearbook estimated 100-150T battle dead)
Minneapolis Star-Tribune (14 Sept. 1991): 1,500,000
FAS 2000: 1-2M Afghans (1979-89)
USA Today (17 Apr. 1992): more than 2 million.
[MEDIAN: 1.5M]
20 Sept 2001 Christian Science Monitor: 400,000 civilian deaths in the 1990s [http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0920/p1s3-wosc.html]
Factional fighting in Kabul, 1992-96
30 Dec. 2001 AP: 50,000
2 June 2002 LA Times: >50,000 acc2 Red Cross
Atrocities:
2 June 2002 LA Times: 20,000 civilians k. by Soviet air raids, March 1979 in Herat
4 March 1980 AP: 1,300 villagers in Konarha Province k. by Soviets & Afghan govt. "last year"
By Soviets in Kunduz (province in northern Afg.)
27 March 1985 Chicago Tribune: 900 massacred
26 Feb. 1985 AP: 480 civilians massacred at Chahardara (town) ca. Feb. 2/3
Taliban POWs k. by Northern Alliance in Mazar-i-Sharif, May 1997
28 Nov.1998 NY Times: up to 2,000
26 Aug. 2002 Newsweek: 1,250
By Taliban in Mazar-e Sharif, Nov. 1998
13 Nov. 1998 News-India Times: 5,000-8,000 massacred
28 Nov.1998 Washington Post: 2,000-5,000 ethnic Hazara civilians k.
Harff & Gurr: 1,000,000 old regime loyalists, rebel supporters were victims of revolutionary politicide.
Soviet deaths:
FAS 2000: ca. 14,500
20 May 88 Chicago Tribune: 12-15,000 killed
Isby, War in a Distant Country: 13,310 KIA as of 25 May 1988
24 Dec. 1989 Arizona Republic: 13,310
War Annual 6 (1994): 13,833
Wallechinsky: 14,454, incl. 11,381 in combat
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88): 1 000 000 [make link]
Most newpaper articles agree on the number, but they can't agree on the number of what. They talk of a million "killed", a million "killed and wounded", or a million "casualties". Here are the estimates among the sources which specify the number as killed:
Eckhardt: 377,000 as of 1987
Hammond: 400,000
5 March 1991 AP
Iran has acknowledged 135,000 mil. + civ. k.
Western military analysts: 2 or 3 times higher
Diplomats in Baghdad: 100,000 Iraqi dead
[Total: (?) 437,500 � 67,500]
Conservative Western estimates: 1M k. or wd.
Dunnigan (1991): over 500,000
Dictionary of 20C World History: >500,000
Bulloch & Morris, The Gulf War (1989): 500,000
SIPRI 1989: 532,000
Clodfelter
Iranians: best est. 450,000 (as high as 730,000)
Iraqis: 150,000 (as high as 340,000)
[TOTAL: 600,000 (as high as 1,070,000)
Chirot
Iranians: 400,000-600,000
Iraqis: 200,000
[TOTAL: 700,000 � 100,000]
MEDIAN: 700,000-1,000,000
Iranians: 500,000-600,000
Iraqis: 200,000-300,000
WPA3: 1,000,000 (600,000 Iranians and 400,000 Iraqis)
Compton's Encyclopedia: 1,000,000
Encarta: 1,000,000
Toronto Star (11 Dec 88): 1,000,000
San Francisco Chronicle (29 Jan. 1991): 1,000,000
Our Times: at least 1,000,000
War Annual 4: 1,000,000 (600,000 Iranians and 400,000 Iraqis)
B&J: 1,000,000 (400,000 Iranians and 200,000 Iraqis)
Timeframe: 1,200,000 (900,000 Iranians and 300,000 Iraqis)
The web site of the President of Iran gives the number as both 1M KIA and 1M K&W on the same page. [http://www.president.ir/cronicnews/1380/8003/800301/800301.htm]
Sudan (1983 et seq.): 1 900 000 [make link]
[Listed Chronologically]
War Annual 4 (1990): 500,000 dead, 1983-89
Dunnigan (1991): 500,000
Washington Post: 500,000 (12 Feb. 1993)
Detroit Free Press (AP): 1,300,000 "in the fighting and resulting famines" (14 Jan. 1997) [http://www.freep.com/news/nw/qsudan14.htm]
B&J (1997): 1,500,000 (1983-95)
SIPRI 1997: 37,000 to 40,000 battle dead
CDI: 1,000,000 (1983-97)
BBC News Online: 1,500,000 "in fighting and related famines" (4 June 1998) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/africa/newsid_106000/106635.stm]
Time: 1,500,000 killed, 1983-98 (27 July 1998)
U.S. Committee for Refugees: 1,900,000 (Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 10 Dec. 1998) [http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.pdf] This report updates a 1993 study, which had estimated that 1.3M had died thus far.
Dict.Wars (1999): 1.5M (1956-98)
29 April 1999 AP: 1.5M
Ploughshares 2000: 2M
23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News: 2M
10 Nov. 2003 Baltimore Sun: 1.5M
NY Times 27 June 2004: >2M
[MEDIAN of last 7 estimates: 1.9M]
Kinshasa Congo (1998 et seq.): 3 800 000 [make link]
NY Times, Chicago Tribune (9 June 2000): 1,700,000 excess deaths in eastern Congo due to civil war, incl. 200,000 killed by violence. (International Rescue Committee study)
International Rescue Committee, newer study (8 May 2001): 2,500,000 excess deaths in eastern Congo due to civil war, incl. 350,000 killed by violence. The next study, dated 8 April 2003, estimated 3.3M d.
International Rescue Committee, newest study: 3,800,000 excess deaths in D.R. Congo from the start of the Second Congo War through April 30, 2005. [http://intranet.theirc.org/docs/DRC_MortalitySurvey2004_RB_8Dec04.pdf]

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Last updated November 2005

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